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Abstract
In this article, we consider how important developments in game the-
ory have contributed to the theory of industrial organization. Our goal is
not to survey the theory of industrial organization; rather, we consider the
contribution of game theory through a careful discussion of a small number
of topics within the industrial organization …eld. We also identify some
points in which developments in the theory of industrial organization have
contributed to game theory. The topics that we consider are: commitment
in two-stage games and the associated theories of strategic-trade policy and
entry deterrence; asymmetric-information games and the associated theo-
ries of limit pricing and predation; repeated games with public moves and
the associated theory of collusion in markets with public demand ‡uctua-
tions; mixed-strategy equilibria and puri…cation theory and the associated
theory of sales; and repeated games with imperfect monitoring and the
associated theory of collusion and price wars. We conclude with a gen-
eral assessment concerning the contribution of game theory to industrial
organization.
1. Introduction
Game theory has become the standard language of industrial organization: the
industrial organization theory literature is now presented almost exclusively in
¤Bagwell: Columbia University (Economics Department and Graduate School of Business)
and NBER; Wolinsky: Northwestern University (Economics Department). This article was
written for the Handbook of Game Theory. We thank Rob Porter and Xavier Vives for helpful
discussions. Financial support from the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
terms of game theoretic models. But the relationship is not totally one-sided.
First, the needs of industrial organization fed back and exerted a general in‡uence
on the agenda of game theory. Second, speci…c ideas that grew out of problems in
industrial organization gained independent importance as game theoretic topics
in their own right. Third, it is mostly through industrial organization that game
theory was brought on large scale into economics and achieved its current standing
as a fundamental branch of economic theory.
A systematic survey of the use of game theory in industrial organization would
amount in fact to a survey of industrial organization theory. This is an enormous
task that has been taken up by numerous textbooks.1 The purpose of this article
is not to survey this …eld, but rather to illustrate through the discussion of a
small selection of subjects how some important developments in game theory have
been incorporated into the theory of industrial organization and to pinpoint their
contribution to this theory. We will also identify some points in which industrial
organization theory raised a contribution to game theory. The models discussed
are selected according to two criteria. First, they utilize a relatively major game
theoretic idea. The second requirement is that the use of the game theoretic idea
yields a relatively sharp economic insight.
Mathematical models in economics allow ideas to be expressed in a clear and
precise way. In particular, they clarify the circumstances under which ideas are
valid. They also facilitate the application of mathematical techniques, which
sometimes yield insights that could not be obtained by simple introspection alone.2
We will argue below that game theoretic models in industrial organization serve
both of these functions.
As mentioned above, we do not intend to survey the …eld of industrial orga-
nization or the most important contributions to it. As a result, many important
contributions and many in‡uential contributors are not mentioned here. This
should not be misinterpreted to suggest that these contributions are unimportant
or that they are less important than those that were actually selected for the
survey.
1Tirole’s (1988) comprehensive text is a standard reference.
2For example, some dynamic models begin with simple assumptions on, say, consumption
and investment behavior that then give rise to a system that displays cyclical or even erratic
aggregate behavior.
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2. The role of commitment: an application of two-stage
games
The role of commitment to future actions as a means of in‡uencing rivals’ be-
havior is a central theme in the analysis of oligopolistic competition. In a typical
entry deterrence scenario, for example, an incumbent monopoly …rm attempts to
protect its market against entry of competitors by committing to post-entry be-
havior that would make entry unpro…table. In other scenarios, …rms make partial
commitments to future behavior through decisions on the adoption of technolo-
gies or through long-term contracts with their agents. The framework used in the
literature for discussing these issues is that of a multi-stage game with subgame
perfect equilibrium (Selten (1965)) as the solution concept.
The basic model
Two …rms, 1 and 2, interact over two stages as follows. In the …rst stage
the …rms simultaneously choose the magnitudes, ki, i = 1; 2. In the second, af-
ter observing the ki’s, they choose simultaneously the magnitudes xi, i = 1; 2.
Firm i’s pro…t is given by the function ¼i(xi; xj ; ki), i = 1; 2, where j 6= i. A
strategy for …rm i, [ki; xi(ki; kj)], prescribes a choice of ki for stage 1 and a
choice of xi for stage 2, as a function of the ki’s chosen in the …rst stage. A
subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) is a strategy pair, [k¤i ; x
¤
i (ki; kj)], i = 1; 2,
such that: (A) for all (ki; kj); x¤i (ki; kj) = argmaxx ¼i[x; x
¤











j ; ki); ki]:
Thus, the xi’s are the direct instruments of competition in that they enter the
rival’s pro…t directly, while the ki’s have only an indirect e¤ect. In many applica-
tions, the interpretation given is that the ki’s represent productive capacities or
technologies and the xi’s describe quantities or prices of the …nal product. With
the two-stage structure, ki has a dual role: besides being a direct ingredient in the
…rm’s pro…t, independently of the interaction, it also has a strategic role of in‡u-
encing the rival’s behavior in the second-stage subgame. The manner in which ki
a¤ects xj is credible in the sense of the SPE concept: ki a¤ects xj only through
shifting the second-stage equilibrium.
Perhaps the main qualitative result of this model, in its general form, is that
the strategic role for ki results in a distortion of its equilibrium level away from the
level that would be optimal were xj una¤ected by ki. When ki is interpreted as
capacity, this result means over or under investment in capacity as may be the case.
The following proposition gives a precise statement of this result. Assume that
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¼i, i = 1; 2, is di¤erentiable, @¼i=@xj 6= 0, there exists a unique SPE equilibrium,
and x¤i is a di¤erentiable function of (ki; kj).















i ]=@ki 6= 0:






i ]; i =
1; 2. The …rst order condition for equilibrium condition (B) is d¼i=dki = 0, or
d¼i=dki ´ (@¼i=@xi)(@x¤i =@ki) + (@¼i=@xj)(@x¤j=@ki) + (@¼i=@ki) = 0:
Using the …rst order condition for condition (A), @¼i=@xi = 0, we get
d¼i=dki = (@¼i=@xj)(@x
¤
j=@ki) + (@¼i=@ki) = 0
from which the proposition follows directly.
As a benchmark for comparison, consider the single-stage version of this game
in which the …rms choose (ki; xi), i = 1,2, simultaneously. The Nash equi-
librium (Nash (1950)) of this game is (ki; xi), i = 1,2, such that (ki; xi) =
argmaxk;x ¼i(x; xj ; k).
Corollary: ki is in general di¤erent from k¤i .
Proof. The …rst order condition for the equilibrium in the one-stage game is
@¼i(xi; xj ; ki)=@ki = 0:
Since x¤i (ki; kj) = xi, it follows that
@¼i[x
¤
i (ki; kj); x
¤
j(kj ; ki); ki]=@ki = @¼i(xi; xj ; ki)=@ki = 0:
Therefore, it has to be that (ki; kj) 6= (k¤i ; k¤j ), or else Proposition 2.1 will be
contradicted.
Discussion
From a conceptual point of view the two-stage oligopoly model is of course
straightforward, and the main result of this model is an obvious implication of the
SPE concept. The two-stage model does, however, provide a useful framework for
discussing the role of commitment in oligopolistic competition. First, it embodies
a clear notion of credibility. Second, it thereby serves to identify the features
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that facilitate e¤ective commitment: durable decisions that become observable
before the actual interaction takes place. Third, it has been applied to a variety
of speci…c economic scenarios and yielded interesting economic insights. The
previous literature recognized the potential importance of commitment, but it
did not manage to organize and understand the central idea in the clear form
that the above model does.
An application to strategic trade theory
To see the type of economic insight that this model generates, consider its
application to the theory of international trade (Brander and Spencer (1985)).
Two …rms, 1 and 2, are based in two di¤erent countries and export their products
to a third country (the rest of the world). The product is homogenous, production
costs are 0 and the demand is given by p = 1¡Q, where Q is the total quantity.
The interaction unfolds in two stages. In the …rst stage, the two governments
simultaneously choose excise tax (subsidy) rates, ti, to be levied on their home
…rms. In the second stage, the tax rules are observed and the …rms play a Cournot
duopoly game: they simultaneously choose outputs qi and the price is determined
by p = 1¡ q1¡ q2. The e¤ective cost functions in the second stage are ci(qi; ti) =
tiqi. The objective of …rm i is maximization of its after-tax pro…t,
Fi(qi; qj ; ti) = (1¡ qi ¡ qj)qi ¡ tiqi:
The objective of each government is maximization of its country’s “true” pro…t:
the sum of its …rm’s pro…t and the tax revenue,
Gi(qi; qj; ti) = Fi(qi; qj; ti) + tiqi:
Since the government cares only about the sum, it chooses to tax only if the tax
plays a strategic role and manipulates the second-stage competition in favor of its
…rm.
This application may be analyzed using the two-stage model developed above,
although strictly speaking this is a slightly di¤erent case. The di¤erence is that
the stage-one commitments are now made by di¤erent parties (the exporting
governments) than those who interact in stage two (the …rms). However, the
analysis remains the same. (The function Gi and the variables qi and ti in this
case correspond to ¼i; xi and ki in the general model above.) Solving for the
SPE of this two-stage game, we get that the governments subsidize their …rms:
t1 = t2 = ¡1=5. In comparison to the equilibrium in the absence of govern-




R2 with no subsidy 
R1 with no subsidy 
R1 with subsidy 
 
Figure 2.1:
lower. The intuition becomes more transparent by looking at the reaction func-
tions, Ri(qj ; ti) = argmaxqi Fi[qi; qj ; ti], depicted by Figure 2.1. The solid curves
correspond to the case with no tax or subsidy. Their intersection point gives the
second-stage equilibrium in this case. The dashed R1 curve corresponds to a sub-
sidy for …rm 1, and its intersection with the R2 curve gives the equilibrium when
…rm 1 is subsidized and …rm 2 is not. The subsidy makes …rm 1 more aggressive in
the sense that, for any expectation that it might have regarding …rm 2 ’s output, it
produces more than it would with no subsidy. This induces …rm 2 to contract its
output in equilibrium. Notice that, for a given output of …rm 2, country 1’s pro…t
is higher with no subsidization, since the subsidy induces its …rm to produce “too
much.” But the strategic e¤ect on the other …rm’s output makes subsidization
pro…table and in equilibrium both governments o¤er export subsidies.
This is a striking insight that provides a clear and plausible explanation for
export subsidies. To believe this explanation, one need not suppose that the
governments see clearly through these strategic considerations. It is enough that
they somehow think that subsidization improves their …rms’ competitive posi-
tion. Also, despite its simplicity, this insight truly requires the game theoretic
framework: it cannot be obtained without rigorous consideration of the strategic
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Figure 2.2:
But further thought reveals that this insight is somewhat less convincing than
it might have seemed at a …rst glance. Consider an alternative version of the
model (Eaton and Grossman (1986)) in which the second-stage competition is a
di¤erentiated product Bertrand game: the …rms simultaneously choose prices pi
and the demands are qi(pi; pj) = 1¡ pi + ®pj, with 0 < ® < 1. Now,
Fi(pi; pj ; ti) = (1¡ pi + ®pj)(pi ¡ ti)
and
Gi(pi; pj ; ti) = Fi(pi; pj ; ti) + ti(1¡ pi + ®pj):
Repeating the above analysis for this case (now, the variable pi corresponds to xi in
the general model), the reaction functions are Ri(pj ; ti) = argmaxpi Fi[pi; pj; ti].
Figure 2.2 depicts the reaction functions in this case. Here, too, the dashed
reaction function of …rm 1 corresponds to a subsidy for …rm 1. As before, the
subsidy makes …rm 1 more aggressive, inducing it to charge a lower price for any
expectation it holds. But here this change in …rm 1’s position induces …rm 2 to
choose a lower price (as seen by comparing the two intersection points), and so an
export subsidy now has a strategic cost, as it results in more aggressive behavior
by the rival …rm. Indeed, in the equilibrium of this scenario, the governments tax
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their …rms at level t1 = t2 = ®2(2 + ®)=[8¡ 4®2 ¡ ®3], and prices and countries’
pro…ts are above their counterparts in the absence of intervention.
This, too, is a very clear insight. But, of course, the results here are almost
the exact opposites of the results obtained above with the second-stage Cournot
game. There are two views regarding the implications of this contrast. The
more skeptical view maintains that the simple one-shot models of Cournot and
Bertrand are only some sort of a parable. They are meant to capture the idea
that in oligopolistic competition …rms are aware that their rivals are also rational
players who face similar decisions, and to point out that this sort of interaction
might result in an ine¢cient outcome from the …rms’ perspective. But they are not
meant to provide realistic descriptions of such competition. Thus, observations
which depend on …ner features of the structure of these models should not be
regarded as true substantive insights. According to this view then, the only
substantive insight here is that in principle there might be a strategic motive
for the taxation/subsidization of exports. But the ambiguity of the results does
not allow a useful prediction; in fact, it makes it hard to believe that this is a
signi…cant consideration in such scenarios.
A less skeptical view maintains that there is indeed a meaningful distinction
between the sort of situations that are captured by the Cournot and Bertrand
models. It can be argued that oligopolistic competition involves investments in
production technologies (or capacities) followed by pricing decisions. The impor-
tant strategic features of the Cournot model can be associated with the investment
decisions, whereas the Bertrand model captures the pricing decisions.3 The re-
sults in the Cournot case thus rationalize strategic subsidization of research and
development or other investment activities aimed at reducing cost or expanding
capacity in export industries. So this view attributes to this analysis further
content than the general insight that export subsidization might have a strategic
role. It interprets the diverse predictions of the models of Cournot and Bertrand
as re‡ecting important di¤erences in the environment (e.g., regarding the age of
the industry), which may understandably a¤ect the outcome.
As mentioned above, the two-stage model reviewed here has been similarly
employed in a number of di¤erent economic applications (e.g., capital investment,
managerial incentive schemes). The sharp distinction between the predictions of
the Cournot and Bertrand models appears in many of these applications.4 In the
3This understanding is related to the analysis of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) and subse-
quent work.
4Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985) develop a general framework to which most
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light of this, it is useful to emphasize that the qualitative e¤ects described in the
next application arise independently of the form of oligopoly competition.
Application to the question of entry deterrence
We close this section by reviewing brie‡y the development of the theoretical
literature on entry deterrence that led to the adoption of the two-stage game
framework discussed above. The manner in which this literature struggled with
the concept of commitment may help to illustrate the nontrivial contribution of
the above described framework toward improving the quality of this discussion.
We do not expand here on the economic motivations of this literature, since these
issues will be discussed in the next section.
Although earlier contributions to this literature took a variety of forms, it
is convenient to present the ideas in the context of the two-stage framework of
this section.5 An incumbent monopoly and a potential entrant interact over two
periods. In the …rst (pre-entry) period, the incumbent selects a price, which is
observed by the entrant. In the second (post-entry) period, the entrant decides
whether or not to enter. Entry entails a …xed cost, and the incumbent’s pro…t in
the post-entry interaction with the entrant is lower than its pro…t as a continuing
monopoly.
The earlier literature explored a particular model of this form and developed
the notion of a limit price. In the context of this model, the incumbent limit
prices when it chooses a relatively low price, typically lower than the regular
monopoly price, that would render entry unpro…table, if this price were to prevail
as well in the post-entry period. The potential entrant then responds by staying
out. This model, however, entails the seemingly implausible assumption that the
incumbent would choose to maintain its pre-entry price in the event that entry
actually occurred. Furthermore, if we are unwilling to make this assumption, then
it is no longer clear why the pre-entry price should a¤ect the expected pro…t from
entry and thus the entry decision itself. If we think, for example, that the post-
entry interaction in fact takes the form of a standard duopoly game, and that
the post-entry demand and cost functions are independent of the pre-entry price,
then the potential entrant’s expected duopoly pro…t should also be independent of
the pre-entry price. It is therefore doubtful that the entry of rational competitors
of these applications belong. They also coined the terms “strategic substitutes” and “strate-
gic complements” to describe the cases of downward- and upward-sloping reaction functions,
respectively. See also Fudenberg and Tirole (1984).
5Important contributions to the early literature on limit pricing include those by Bain (1949)
and Modigliani (1958).
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can be blocked in this manner. This suggests that limit pricing emerges as part
of a credible entry deterrence strategy, only if some alternative mechanism (other
than price commitment) is identi…ed that links the incumbent’s pre-entry price
to the potential entrant’s expected pro…t from entry.
Motivated by this understanding, the next step in the development of this
theory (Spence (1977)) introduced the possibility that the incumbent selects a
level of capacity in the pre-entry period. An investment in capacity is plausibly
irreversible, and so an investment of this kind is a natural means through which
an incumbent may credibly commit to be an active participant in the market.
In particular, the idea was that entry would be deterred when an incumbent
invested signi…cantly in capacity, if the incumbent were to threaten that it would
utilize its capacity to the fullest extent in the post-entry interaction. The notion
of a limit price gets here a di¤erent meaning. The pre-entry price is no longer
a strategic instrument for blocking entry. But if the entry deterring investment
level reduces the incumbent’s marginal cost relative to that of an unthreatened
monopoly, the entry threat might have the e¤ect of lowering the incumbent’s pre-
entry price. This would have the appearance of a limit price, but it is actually
only a by-product of the entry deterring investment.
While Spence’s model identi…ed capacity as a plausible pre-entry commitment
variable, it still did not evaluate the credibility of the threatened utilization of the
installed capacity. In fact, the threatened entry deterring output is not always
credible in the SPE sense—the equilibrium in a post-entry duopoly game does not
necessarily entail utilization of the capacity installed as a threat. This shortcoming
was addressed by the next step of this theory (Dixit (1980)) which introduced a
formal two-stage game model, of the family discussed in this section, with SPE as
the solution concept. The incumbent’s threat backed by its pre-entry investment is
credible in the sense that it is manifests itself through its e¤ect on the equilibrium
of the post-entry duopoly game. Appropriate versions of this model thus explain
excessive investment in capacity and the associated low pre-entry price as credible
responses to entry threats.
From the viewpoint of pure game theory, the …nal model that capped this
literature is rather straightforward. But the extent of its contribution, even if
only to sharpen the relationship between price, capacity and deterrence, should
be evident from looking at the long process of insightful research that led to that
point.
10
3. Entry deterrence and predation: applications of sequen-
tial equilibrium
It is widely agreed that unhindered exercise of monopoly power generally results in
ine¢cient resource allocation and that anti-trust policy aimed at the prevention
of monopolization is therefore a legitimate form of government intervention in
the operation of markets. A major concern of anti-trust policy has been the
identi…cation and prevention of practices that lead to monopolization of industries.
This concern has motivated a large body of theory aimed at understanding and
classifying the di¤erent forms that monopolization e¤orts might take and their
economic consequences.
Monopolization takes a variety of forms ranging from more cooperative en-
deavors, like merger and cartelization, to more hostile practices, like entry de-
terrence and predation. The last part of the previous section described some of
the developments in the understanding of entry deterrence by means of pricing
and preemptive investment. The related notion of predation refers to attempts
to induce the exit of competitors by using similar aggressive tactics. The treat-
ment of predation and entry deterrence raises some subtle issues, both in theory
and in practice, since it is naturally di¢cult to distinguish between “legitimate”
competitive behavior that enhances e¢ciency and anti-competitive behavior that
ultimately reduces welfare.
In fact, it has been often argued that predation or entry deterrence through
aggressive pricing behavior is not a viable strategy among rational …rms. The
implication is that instances of aggressive price cutting should not be interpreted
along these lines. The logic of this argument was explained in the previous section:
a credible predatory or entry deterring activity must create a meaningful commit-
ment link to the behavior of this …rm in its future interactions. But, with rational
players, an aggressive pricing policy does not in itself plausibly constitute such a
commitment. This argument leads to the following conclusion: when aggressive
pricing appears in instances of entry deterrence (or predation), it is a by-product
of a strategic investment in capacity, rather than a strategic instrument in its own
right.
The following discussion exposes a signi…cant limitation to this conclusion.
It shows that, when informational di¤erences about cost (or other parameters
that a¤ect pro…t) are important, it is possible to revive the traditional view of
the limit price literature that pricing policies may serve as direct instruments of
monopolization. The idea is that, in the presence of such asymmetric information,
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prices might also transmit information and as such play a direct role in in‡uencing
the entry or exit decisions of rivals.
Limit pricing under asymmetric information
Milgrom and Roberts (1982a) consider the classic scenario of a monopoly in-
cumbent facing a single potential entrant. The novel feature of their analysis is
that the incumbent has some private information regarding its costs of production.
This information is valuable to the entrant, as its post–entry pro…t is a¤ected by
the incumbent’s level of cost: the lower is the incumbent’s cost, the lower is the
entrant’s pro…t from entry. Thus, in place of the commitment link studied by the
earlier literature, Milgrom and Roberts propose an informational link between
the incumbent’s pre-entry behavior and the entrant’s expected post-entry pro…t.
The situation can be modeled as a signaling game: the entrant attempts to
infer the cost information by observing the incumbent’s pre-entry pricing, while
the incumbent chooses its price with the understanding that this choice may a¤ect
the prospect of entry. The incumbent would like the entrant to think that its
costs are low to make entry seem less pro…table. As in other signaling models, the
equilibrium price-signal therefore may be distorted away from its myopic level. In
the present context, the price is distorted if it di¤ers from the myopic monopoly
price (i.e., the price that would prevail in the absence of the entry threat). To
correspond to the original limit price conjecture, the equilibrium price has to be
distorted downwards from the monopoly level. But since lower costs naturally
lead to lower monopoly prices, the downwards distortion is indeed the expected
result in a signaling scenario.
The details of the game are as follows.6 The players are an incumbent monopoly
…rm and a potential entrant. The interaction spans two periods: the pre-entry
period in which the entrant observes the incumbent’s behavior and contemplates
the entry decision, and the post-entry period after the entry decision is resolved
in either way. The incumbent is one of two possible types of …rm di¤ering in their
per-unit cost of production: type t 2 fL;Hg has unit cost c(t), where c(L) < c(H)
so that L and H stand for “low” and “high,” respectively. In the pre-entry pe-
riod, only the incumbent knows its type. It chooses a pre-entry price, p, which
the entrant observes and on the basis of which decides whether to enter. The
incumbent’s pro…t in the pre-entry period is ¦(p; t) = [p¡c(t)]D(p); where D is a
well-behaved downwards-sloping demand function. We abstract from the details
6The discussion here expands on previous presentations by Bagwell and Ramey (1988) and
Fudenberg and Tirole (1986).
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associated with the play of …rms in the post-entry period, and simply summa-
rize the outcomes of that period. If the entrant does not enter, then its pro…t is
0 and the incumbent remains a monopoly and earns ¼m(t); if the entrant does
enter, it learns the incumbent’s cost and the resulting post-entry duopoly pro…ts
are ¼d(t) for the incumbent and ¼e(t) to the entrant. It is assumed that entry
reduces the incumbent’s post-entry pro…t, ¼m(t) > ¼d(t); and that the entrant
can recover any …xed costs associated with entry only against the high-cost in-
cumbent, ¼e(H) > 0 > ¼e(L): Note that ¼m(t) admits a variety of interpretations:
it might be simply the discounted maximized value of ¦(p; t), or it might pertain
to a di¤erent length of time and/or re‡ect some further future interactions.
The game theoretic model is then a simple sequential game of incomplete
information. The formal description is as follows. Nature chooses the incumbent’s
type t 2 fL;Hg with probability b0t ; where b0L+b0H = 1. The incumbent’s strategy
is a pricing function P : fL;Hg ! [0;1). The entrant’s belief function bt :
[0;1)! [0; 1] describes the probability it assigns to type t, given the incumbent’s
price p. Of course, for all p, bL(p) + bH(p) = 1. A strategy for the entrant is a
function E : [0;1)! f0; 1g that describes the entry decision as a function of the
incumbent’s price, where “1” and “0” represent the entry and no-entry decisions,
respectively. The payo¤s as functions of price p 2 [0;1), entry decision e 2 f0; 1g,
and cost type t 2 fL;Hg are: for the incumbent,
V (p; e; t) = ¦(p; t) + e¼d(t) + (1¡ e)¼m(t)
and for the entrant,
u(p; e; t) = e¼e(t):
It is convenient to introduce special notation for the entrant’s expected payo¤
evaluated with its beliefs. Letting b denote the pair of functions (bL; bH),
U(p; e; b) = bL(p)u(p; e; L) + bH(p)u(p; e;H):
Observe that U(p; 0; b) = 0 and U(p; 1; b) = bL(p)¼e(L) + bH(p)¼e(H).
The solution concept is sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson (1982a))
augmented by the “intuitive criterion” re…nement (Cho and Kreps (1987)). For
the present game, a sequential equilibrium is a speci…cation of strategies and
beliefs, fP;E; bg, satisfying three requirements:
(E1) Rationality for the incumbent:
P (t) 2 argmax
p
V (p; E(p); t); t = L;H
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(E2) Rationality for the entrant:
E(p) 2 argmax
e
U(p; e; b(p)) for all p ¸ 0
(E3) Bayes-Consistency:
P (L) = P (H) implies bL(P (L)) = b
0
L:
P (L) 6= P (H) implies bL(P (L)) = 1; bL(P (H)) = 0
As (E3) indicates, there are two types of sequential equilibria. In a pooling
equilibrium (P (L) = P (H)), the entrant learns nothing from the observation of
the equilibrium price, and so the posterior and the prior beliefs agree; whereas in a
separating equilibrium (P (L) 6= P (H)), the entrant is able to infer the incumbent’s
cost type upon observing the equilibrium price.
For this game, sequential equilibrium places no restrictions on the beliefs that
the entrant holds when a deviant price p =2 fP (L); P (H)g is observed. For exam-
ple, the analyst may specify that the entrant is very optimistic and infers high
costs upon observing a deviant price. In this event, the incumbent may be espe-
cially reluctant to deviate from a proposed equilibrium, and so it becomes possible
to construct a great many sequential equilibria. The set of sequential equilibria
here will be re…ned by imposing the following “plausibility” restriction on the
entrant’s beliefs following a deviant price:
(E4) Intuitive beliefs:
bt(p) = 1 if for t 6= t0 2 fL;Hg;
V (p; 0; t) ¸ V [P (t); E(P (t)); t] and V (p; 0; t0) < V [P (t0); E(P (t0)); t0]
The idea is that an incumbent of given type would never charge a price p that,
even when followed by the most favorable response of the entrant, would be less
pro…table than following the equilibrium. Thus, if a deviant price is observed that
could possibly improve upon the equilibrium pro…t only for a low-cost incumbent,
then the entrant should believe that the incumbent has low costs. In what follows,
we say that a triplet fP;E; bg forms an intuitive equilibrium if it satis…es (E1)-(E3)
and (E4).
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Before turning to the equilibrium analysis, we impose some more structure on
the payo¤s. The …rst assumption is just a standard technical one, but the second
injects a further meaning to the distinction between the types by ensuring that
the low-cost type is also more eager to prevent entry:
(A1) The function ¦ is well behaved:
9 ep > c(H) such that D(p) > 0 i¤ p < ep, and ¦ is strictly concave and
di¤erentiable on (0; ep):
(A2) The low-cost incumbent loses more from entry:
¼m(L)¡ ¼d(L) ¸ ¼m(H)¡ ¼d(H):
Assumption (A2) is not obviously compelling. It is natural to assume that
the low-cost incumbent fares better than the high-cost one in any case, ¼m(L) >
¼m(H) and ¼d(L) > ¼d(H); but this does not imply the assumed relationship.
This assumption is satis…ed in a number of well-behaved speci…cations of the
post-entry duopolistic interaction, but it might be violated in other standard
examples.
We observe next that a low-cost incumbent is more attracted to a low pre-entry
price than is a high-cost incumbent, since the consequent increase in demand is
less costly for the low-cost incumbent. Formally, for p; p0 2 (0; ep) such that p < p0,
¦(p; L)¡¦(p;H) ´ [c(H)¡c(L)]D(p) > [c(H)¡c(L)]D(p0) ´ ¦(p0; L)¡¦(p0; H):
This together with assumption (A2) immediately imply the following single cross-
ing property (SCP):
For any p < p0 and e · e0; if V (p; e;H) = V (p0; e0;H); then V (p; e; L) > V (p0; e0; L):
Under (SCP), if a high-cost incumbent is indi¤erent between two price-entry pairs,
then a low-cost incumbent prefers the pair with a lower price and a (weakly) lower
rate of entry. In particular, to deter entry the low-cost incumbent would be willing
to accept a deeper price cut than would the high-cost incumbent. As is true
throughout the literature on signaling games, characterization and interpretation
of the equilibria is straightforward when the preferences of the informed player,
here the incumbent, satisfy an appropriate version of (SCP).
Let pmt = argmaxp¦(p; t): This is the (myopic) monopoly price of an incum-
bent of type t. Under our assumptions, it is easily con…rmed that the low-cost
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monopoly price is less than that of the high-cost incumbent: pmL < p
m
H : Consider
now the set of prices p such that
V (p; 0; H) · V (pmH ; 1; H):
The concavity of ¦ in p assures that this inequality holds outside an interval
(p; p) ½ [0; ep], and its reverse holds inside the interval. Thus, p and p are the
prices which give the high-cost incumbent the same payo¤ when it deters entry
as when it selects the high-cost monopoly price and faces entry. Since entry
deterrence is valuable, it follows directly that p < pmH < p:
Let ebL denote the belief that would make the entrant exactly indi¤erent with
respect to entry. It is de…ned by
ebL¼e(L) + (1¡ ebL)¼e(H) = 0:
Proposition 3.1: (i) There exists a separating intuitive equilibrium.
(ii) If pmL ¸ p, then any separating intuitive equilibrium, fP;E; bg, satis…es p =
P (L) < P (H) = pmH and E(P (L)) = 0 < 1 = E(P (H)).
If pmL < p, then any separating intuitive equilibrium, fP;E; bg, satis…es pmL =
P (L) < P (H) = pmH and E(P (L)) = 0 < 1 = E(P (H)).
(iii) If pmL ¸ p, and b0L ¸ ebL, then for every p 2 [p; pmL ], there exists an intuitive
pooling equilibrium in which P (L) = P (H) = p.
(iv) In any intuitive pooling equilibrium, P (L) = P (H) 2 [p; pmL ] and E(P (L)) =
0.
The proof is relegated to the appendix. The proposition establishes unique-
ness of the separating equilibrium outcome. Since the high-cost incumbent faces
entry in the separating equilibrium, its equilibrium price must coincide with its
monopoly price pmH : Otherwise, it would clearly pro…t by deviating to p
m
H from
any other price at which it anyway faces entry. The case pmL ¸ p corresponds
to a relatively small cost di¤erential between the two types of incumbent. It is
the more interesting case, since the separating equilibrium price quoted by the
low-cost incumbent is then distorted away from its monopoly price pmL : The case
pmL < p corresponds to relatively large cost di¤erential which renders p
m
L a domi-
nated choice for the high-cost incumbent and hence removes the tension associated
with the high-cost incumbent’s incentive to mimic the low-cost price.
When the prior probability of the low-cost type is su¢ciently large, b0L ¸ ebL,
there are also pooling equilibria. These equilibria do not exist when b0L <
ebL, since
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at a putative pooling equilibrium the entrant would choose to enter and hence the
incumbent would pro…t from deviating to its monopoly price pmt :
Both the separating and the pooling equilibria exhibit limit price behavior,
but these patterns are qualitatively very di¤erent. The separating equilibrium
exhibits limit pricing in the sense that, for certain parameter values, P (L) < pmL :
But the separating equilibrium di¤ers from the traditional limit price theory in
the important sense that equilibrium limit pricing does not deter entry, which
occurs under the same conditions (namely, when the incumbent has high costs)
that would generate entry in a complete-information setting. The e¤ect of the
limit price on entry is through the cost information that it credibly reveals to
the entrant. Limit pricing also occurs in the pooling equilibria. The high-cost
incumbent now practices limit pricing, as P (H) < pmH in any pooling equilibrium,
and the low-cost incumbent also selects a limit price, as P (L) < pmL in all these
equilibria save the one in which pooling occurs at pmL . In contrast with the limit
pricing of the separating equilibrium, and in accordance with the traditional no-
tion, the limit price here does deter entry. The rate of entry is lower than would
occur under complete information, since the high-cost incumbent is able to deter
entry when it pools its price with that of the low-cost incumbent.
Earlier literature on the traditional notion of limit pricing associated with
this practice a welfare trade-o¤: lower prices generate immediate welfare gains
but deter or reduce entry and thus lead to future welfare losses. The form of
limit pricing that arises under the separating equilibrium is actually bene…cial for
welfare, since the low-cost incumbent signals its information with a low price and
this does not come at the expense of entry. Instead, it is the pooling equilibria
that exhibit the welfare trade-o¤ that the earlier literature associated with limit
pricing. While the low pre-entry prices tend to improve welfare, the reduction
in entry lowers welfare in the post-entry period, as compared to the welfare that
would be achieved in a complete-information setting.
The set of equilibria may be further re…ned with a requirement that the se-
lected equilibrium is Pareto e¢cient for the low- and high-cost incumbent among
the set of intuitive equilibria. When pooling equilibria exist (the conditions of
part (iii) of the proposition hold), then the pooling equilibrium in which the
low-cost monopoly price is selected is the e¢cient one for the low- and high-cost
incumbent in the relevant set. This equilibrium gives the low-cost incumbent
the maximum possible payo¤. It also o¤ers a higher payo¤ to the high-cost in-
cumbent than occurs in the separating equilibrium, since pmL ¸ p implies that
V (pmL ; 0;H) ¸ V (p; 0;H) = V (pmH ; 1; H).
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Predation
Generally speaking, a …rm practices predatory pricing if it charges “abnor-
mally” low prices in an attempt to induce exit of its competitors. The ambiguity
of this de…nition is not incidental. It re‡ects the inherent di¢culty of drawing a
clear distinction between legitimate price competition and pricing behavior that
embodies predatory intent. Indeed, an important objective of the theoretical
discussion of this subject is to come up with relatively simple criteria for distin-
guishing between legitimate price competition and predation.
Exit inducing behavior is of course closely related to entry deterring behavior
and, indeed, a small variation on the limit pricing model presented above can
also be used to discuss predation. Consider, then, the following variation on the
limit price game. In the …rst period, both …rms (referred to as the “predator”
and the “prey”) are in the market and choose prices simultaneously. Then the
prey, who must incur a …xed cost if it remains in the market, decides whether or
not to exit. Finally, in the second period, the active …rms again choose prices. If
the prey exits, the predator earns monopoly pro…t; on the other hand, if the prey
remains in the market, the two …rms earn some duopoly pro…ts. In equilibrium,
the prey exits when its expected period-two pro…t is insu¢cient to cover its …xed
costs. Clearly, in any SPE of the complete-information version of this game, no
predation takes place, as the prey’s expectation is independent of the predator’s
…rst-stage price. However, when the prey is uncertain about the predator’s cost,
as in the above limit pricing model, then an informational link appears between
the predator’s …rst-period price and the prey’s expected pro…t from remaining in
the market. Recognizing that the prey will base its exit decision upon its inference
of the predator’s cost type, the predator may price low in order to signal that its
costs are low and thus induce exit. The equilibria of this model are analogous
to those described in Proposition 3.1, with exit occurring under the analogous
circumstances to those under which entry was deterred. This variation provides
an equilibrium foundation for the practice of predatory pricing, in which predation
is identi…ed with low prices that are selected with the intention of a¤ecting the
exit decision.
From a welfare standpoint, the predation that occurs as part of a separating
equilibrium is actually bene…cial. Predation brings the immediate welfare bene…t
of a lower price, and it induces the exit of a rival in exactly the same circum-
stances as would occur in a complete-information environment. When the game
is expanded to include an initial entry stage (Roberts (1985)), however, a new
wrinkle appears, as the rational anticipation of predatory signaling may deter the
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entry of the prey, resulting in a possible welfare cost.
Discussion
The notion that limit pricing can serve to deter entry has a long history in in-
dustrial organization, with a number of theoretical and empirical contributions.7
The signaling model of entry deterrence contributed to this literature a number of
new theoretical insights. First and foremost, it identi…ed two patterns of rational
behavior that may be interpreted in terms of the “anti-competitive” practices of
entry deterrence and predation. One pattern, exempli…ed by the pooling equilib-
ria, exhibits anti-competitive behavior in its traditional meaning of eliminating
competition that would otherwise exist. The other pattern, exempli…ed by the
separating equilibrium, takes the appearance of anti-competitive behavior but
does not exhibit the traditional welfare consequences of such behavior. These ob-
servations have a believable quality to them both because the main element of this
model is asymmetric information, which is surely often present in such situations,
and because the pooling and separating equilibria have natural and intuitive in-
terpretations. Furthermore, continued research has shown that the basic ideas of
this theory are robust on many fronts.8
Even if these insights had been on some level familiar prior to the introduc-
tion of this model, and this is doubtful, they surely had not been understood as
implications of a closed and internally consistent argument. In fact, it is hard to
envision how these insights could be derived or e¤ectively presented without the
game theoretic framework. So this part of the contribution, the generation and
the crisp presentation of these insights, cannot be doubted.
Still there is the question of whether these elegant insights change signi…cantly
our understanding of actual monopolization e¤orts. Here, it is useful to distin-
guish between qualitative and quantitative contributions. Certainly, as the dis-
cussion above indicates, the signaling model of entry deterrence o¤ers a signi…cant
qualitative argument that identi…es a possible role for pricing in anti-competitive
7A recent empirical analysis is o¤ered by Kadiyali (1996), who studies the U.S. photographic
…lm industry and reports evidence that is consistent with the view that the incumbent (Kodak)
selected a low price and a high level of advertising in the presence of a potential entrant (Fuji).
8There are, however, a couple of variations which alter the results in important ways. First,
as Harrington (1986) shows, if the entrant’s costs are positively correlated with those of the
incumbent, then separating equilibria entail an upward distortion in the high-cost incumbent’s
price. Second, Bagwell and Ramey (1991) show that, when the industry hosts several incumbents
who share private information concerning industry costs, a focal separating equilibrium exists
that entails no pricing distortions whatsoever.
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behavior. It is more di¢cult, however, to assess the extent to which this argument
will lead to a quantitative improvement in our understanding of monopolization
e¤orts. For example, is it possible to identify with con…dence industries in which
behavior is substantially a¤ected by such considerations? Can we seriously hope
to estimate (perhaps even roughly) the quantitative implication of this theory?
We do not have straightforward answers to these questions. The di¢culties in
measurement would make it quite hard to distinguish between the predictions of
this theory and others.
Even the qualitative features of the argument may be of important use in the
formulation of public policy. For example, U.S. anti-trust policy aims at curbing
monopolization and speci…cally prohibits predatory pricing. However, the exact
meaning of this prohibition as well as the manner in which it is enforced have
been subject to continued review over time by the government and the courts.
Two ongoing debates that in‡uence the thinking on this matter are as follows: Is
predation a viable practice in rational interaction? If the possibility of predation
is accepted, what is the appropriate practical de…nition of predation? The ob-
vious policy implication in case predation is not deemed to be a viable practice
is that government intervention is not needed. In the absence of a satisfactory
framework that can supply precise answers, these policy decisions are shaped by
weighing an array of incomplete arguments. Historically, some of the most in‡uen-
tial arguments have been developed as simple applications of basic price theoretic
models. Prominent among these are the “Chicago School” arguments that deny
the viability of predation (McGee (1958)) and the Areeda-Turner Rule (1975) that
associates the act of predation with a price that lies below marginal cost.
With this in mind, there is no doubt that the limit pricing model enriches the
arsenal of arguments in a signi…cant way. First, it provides a theoretical frame-
work that clearly establishes the viability of predatory behavior among rational
competitors. Second, it raises some questions regarding the practical merit of
cost-based de…nitions of predation, like the Areeda-Turner standard: it shows
that predation might occur under broader circumstances than such standards ad-
mit. In a world in which a government bureaucrat or a judge has to reach a
decision on the basis of imprecise impressions, arguments that rely on the logic of
this theory may well have important in‡uence.9
9Other game theoretic treatments of predation, like the reputation theories of Kreps and Wil-
son (1982b) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982b) or the war of attrition perspective of Fudenberg
and Tirole (1987), also provide similar intellectual underpinning for government intervention in
curbing predation.
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4. Collusion: an application of repeated games
One of the main insights drawn from the basic static oligopoly models concerns
the ine¢ciency (from the …rms’ viewpoint) of oligopolistic competition: industry
pro…t is not maximized in equilibrium.10 This ine¢ciency creates an obvious in-
centive for oligopolists to enter into a collusive agreement and thereby achieve a
superior outcome that better exploits their monopoly power. Collusion, however,
is di¢cult to sustain, since typically each of the colluding …rms has incentive to
opportunistically cheat on the agreement. The sustenance of collusion is further
complicated by the fact that explicit collusion is often outlawed. In such cases col-
lusive agreements can not be enforced with reference to legally binding contracts.
Instead, collusive agreements then must be “self enforcing”: they are sustained
through an implicit understanding that “excessively” competitive behavior by any
one …rm will soon lead to similar behavior by other …rms.
Collusion is an important subject in industrial organization. Its presence in
oligopolistic markets tends to further distort the allocation of resources in the
monopolistic direction. For this reason, public policy toward collusion is usually
antagonistic. While there is both anecdotal and more systematic evidence on
the existence of collusive behavior, the informal nature and often illegal status of
collusion makes it di¢cult to evaluate its extent. But regardless of the economy-
wide signi…cance of collusion, this form of behavior is of course of great signi…cance
for certain markets.
The main framework currently used for modeling collusion is that of an in-
…nitely repeated oligopoly game. Since the basic tension in the collusion scenario
is dynamic—a colluding …rmmust balance the immediate gains from opportunistic
behavior against the future consequences of its detection—the analysis of collu-
sion requires a dynamic game which allows for history dependent behavior. The
repeated game is perhaps the simplest model of this type.
The earlier literature, which preceded the introduction of the repeated game
model, recognized the basic tension that confronts colluding …rms and the factors
that a¤ect the stability of collusive agreements (see, e.g., Stigler (1964)). In par-
ticular, this literature contained the understanding that oligopolistic interaction
sometimes results in collusion sustained by threats of future retaliation, and at
other times results in non-collusive behavior of the type captured by the equilibria
10This result appears in an extreme form in the case of the pure Bertrand model, in which
two producers of a homogenous product who incur constant per-unit costs choose their prices
simultaneously. The unique equilibrium prices are equal to marginal cost and pro…ts are zero.
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of the static oligopoly models. But since the formal modeling of this phenomenon
requires a dynamic strategic model, which was not then available in economics,
this literature lacked a coherent formal model.11
The main contribution of the repeated game model of collusion was the in-
troduction of a coherent formal model. The introduction of this model o¤ers two
advantages. First, with such a model, it is possible to present and discuss the
factors a¤ecting collusion in a more compact and orderly manner. Second, the
model enables exploration of more complex relations between the form and extent
of collusive behavior and the underlying features of the market environment. A
contribution of this type is illustrated below by a simple model that characterizes
the behavior of collusive prices in markets with ‡uctuating demand (Rotemberg
and Saloner (1986)). We have selected to feature this application, since it draws a
clear economic insight by utilizing closely the particular structure of the repeated
game model of collusion.
Price wars during booms.
Two …rms play the Bertrand pricing game repeatedly in the following environ-




0 if P > 1
at if P · 1
The production costs are zero. The at’s are i.i.d. random variables which take
the values H and L, where H > L and Probfat = Hg = w = 1¡ Probfat = Lg.
Within each period, events unfold in the following order. First, at is realized
and observed by the …rms. Second, the …rms choose prices, pti 2 [0; 1], i = 1,2,




j), are determined and
distributed. The …rm with the lower price gets the entire market, and when prices












t=2 if pti = p
t
j
0 if pti > p
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As usual, a history at t is a sequence of the form ((a1; p1i ; p
1
j),...,(a




and a strategy si is a sequence (s1i ; s
2
i ; :::), where s
t
i prescribes a price after each
11As we discuss below, the earlier literature sometimes used models of the conjectural varia-
tions style, but these models were somewhat unsatisfactory or even confusing.
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possible history at t. A pair of strategies s = (si; sj) induces a probability distri-
bution over in…nite histories. Let E denote the expectation with respect to this









where ± 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor. The solution concept is SPE. There are of
course many SPE’s. This model focuses on a symmetric SPE that maximizes the
…rms’ payo¤s over the set of all SPE’s.
Proposition 4.1: There exists a symmetric SPE which maximizes the total pay-




p(L) = p(H) = 1 for ± > H
(1+w)H+(1¡w)L
p(L) = 1; p(H) = ±(1¡w)L
H[1¡±(1+w)] for
H
(1+w)H+(1¡w)L ¸ ± ¸ 12
p(H) = p(L) = 0 for ± < 1=2
The proof is relegated to the appendix. The interesting part of this result
obtains for the middle range of ±’s. Over this range, the equilibrium price during
the high-demand state, p(H), is lower than the monopoly price of 1. (For this
range of ±, p(H) = ±(1¡w)L=H[1¡±(1+w)] < 1). On the other hand, in the low-
demand state, the equilibrium price achieves the monopoly price of 1. Rotemberg
and Saloner refer to this result of lower prices during periods with higher demand
as “price wars during booms.” They argue that this is consistent with evidence on
the behavior of oligopolistic industries over di¤erent phases of the business cycle.
The intuition behind this result may be understood in the following general terms.
A …rm is willing to collude if the losses from future punishment outweigh the …rm’s
immediate gain from deviation. In this model, owing to the independence of the
shocks, the future losses are the same in “booms” and “busts.” The immediate
gains from defection at a given price, however, are obviously higher in booms.
Therefore, when ± is not too large, it is impossible to sustain the monopoly price
in a boom. To sustain collusion in a boom, it is necessary to reduce the temptation
to deviate by colluding at a lower price.
Discussion
Let us highlight three points arising from this analysis. The …rst point con-
cerns the substance. Rotemberg and Saloner develop the general point that the
pattern of collusion and the dynamics of demand are related in a predictable way.
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Their analysis also uncovers the speci…c result that collusive prices are lower in
high-demand states. This result derives to some extent from the assumption that
demand shocks exhibit serial independence, and subsequent work has modi…ed
this assumption and reconsidered the relationship between demand levels and
collusive prices. One …nding is that collusion is easier to maintain (i.e., collusive
prices tend to be higher) when future demand growth is expected to be large.
The modi…ed model can be also applied to markets with seasonal (as opposed to
business-cycle) demand ‡uctuations, where the considerations of the oligopolists
might be more transparent due to the greater predictability of the ‡uctuations.
Indeed, recent empirical e¤orts o¤er evidence that is supportive of this hypothe-
sis.12 In any case, whether we consider the Rotemberg-Saloner model as is or one
of its modi…ed versions, the general approach suggested by this framework reveals
considerations that plausibly in‡uence the actual relationship between collusive
prices and demand.
The second point concerns the essential role of the model. It should be noted
that the repeated game model here is not incidental to the analysis. The main
result of the analysis derives explicitly from the trade-o¤ that the …rm faces in
a repeated game between the short-term bene…t from undercutting the rival’s
price and the long-term cost of the consequent punishment. The result would
seem somewhat counter-intuitive if one ignored the game theoretic reasoning and
instead considered the situation using the standard price theoretic paradigms of
monopoly and perfect competition. Of course, those who have the repeated game
reasoning seated in the back of their minds can intuit through this argument
easily, and may come to think that the formal model is super‡uous. But then one
has to have this reasoning already in the back of one’s mind and to associate it
with oligopolistic collusion.
The third point calls attention to one of the important strengths of this frame-
work. The analysis illustrates clearly the ‡exibility with which the basic model
can be adapted to incorporate alternative assumptions on the environment (in
Section 6 this point will be illustrated further by another application that in-
corporates imperfect information into this framework). It would be di¢cult or
12Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) hypothesize that demand rises and then falls as part
of a deterministic cycle, and they …nd that collusive prices are higher when demand is rising.
This model is well–suited for markets that are subject to seasonal demand movements, and
Borenstein and Shephard (1996) report evidence of pricing in the retail gasoline market that
supports the main …nding. Bagwell and Staiger (1997) hypothesize that the demand growth
rate follows a Markov process, so that demand movements are both stochastic and persistent,
and they …nd that collusive prices are higher in fast–growth (i.e., boom) phases.
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even impossible to meaningfully incorporate such features into the conjectural
variations paradigm (see Section 7 below).
We chose to devote much of the above presentation to a rather speci…c model.
It would therefore be useful in closing to take a broader view and call attention to
two fundamental insights of the repeated games literature that contain important
lessons for oligopoly theory. The …rst insight is that a collusive outcome, which
serves the …rms better than the one-shot equilibrium, can be sustained in the
interaction of fully rational competitors (in the sense formalized by the notion of
SPE). The second is that repetition of the one-shot equilibrium is a robust outcome
of such interaction: it is always a SPE and, in many interesting scenarios (e.g.,
…nite horizon, high degree of impatience, short memory), it might even emerge
as the unique one. The …rst insight provides a clear theory of collusion which
can identify some key factors that facilitate collusion. The second shows the
relevance of the static oligopoly models and the insights they generate: their
equilibria continue to have robust and sometimes unique existence in a much
richer dynamic environment. Of course, the consideration of the collusive and non-
collusive outcomes predated the more recent analyses of the repeated game model.
The important contribution of the repeated game framework is in establishing the
validity of these as outcomes of rational and far sighted competition that takes
place over time.
5. Sales: an application of mixed-strategies equilibrium
In many retail markets prices ‡uctuate constantly and substantially. At any
given point in time, some …rms may o¤er a “regular” price, while other …rms
temporarily cut prices and o¤er “sales” or price promotions. The frequency and
the signi…cance of these price movements make it hard to believe that they mirror
changes in the underlying demand and cost conditions.
The earlier literature had largely ignored these phenomena. Sales did not
…t well into the existing price theoretic paradigm, and as a result this practice
may have been viewed as re‡ecting irrational behavior that was better suited for
psychological study than for economic analysis.
The game theoretic notion of a mixed-strategy equilibrium presents an alter-
native view whereby the ubiquitous phenomenon of sales can be interpreted as a
stable outcome of interaction among rational players. We develop this argument
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with Varian’s (1980) model of retail pricing.13 This model highlights a tension
that …rms face between the desire to price high and pro…t on consumers that are
poorly informed as to the available prices and the desire to price low and compete
for consumers that are well informed of prices. This tension is resolved in equi-
librium when …rms’ prices are determined by a mixed strategy. Varian’s theory
thus predicts that …rms will o¤er sales on a random basis, where the event of a
sale is associated with the realization of a low price from the equilibrium mixed
strategy. A dynamic interpretation of this theory further implies that di¤erent
…rms will o¤er sales at di¤erent points in time.
A notable feature of this theory is that it takes the random behavior of the
mixed-strategy equilibrium quite seriously and uses it to directly explain the ran-
domness in prices observed in real markets. At the same time, the mixed-strategy
approach has a well-known potential drawback, associated with the literal inter-
pretation of the assumption that each …rm selects its price in a random manner.
This di¢culty is often addressed with reference to Harsanyi’s (1973) idea that a
featured mixed-strategy equilibrium for a given game can be re-interpreted as a
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for a “nearby” game of incomplete information.
However, there is of course the question of the plausibility of the nearby game for
the application of interest. With these concerns in mind, we develop as well an
explicit and plausible “puri…cation” of the mixed-strategy equilibrium for Varian’s
pricing game. This analysis suggests that the random pattern of sales also can
be understood as re‡ecting small private cost shocks that vary across …rms and
time.
An equilibrium theory of sales
We begin with the basic assumptions of the model. A set of N ¸ 2 symmetric
…rms supplies a homogeneous good at unit cost c to a consumer population of
unit mass. Each consumer demands one unit of the good, and the good provides
a gross utility of v, where v > c ¸ 0. There are two kinds of consumers. A fraction
I 2 (0; 1) of consumers are informed about prices and hence purchase from the
…rm with the lowest price; if more than one low-priced …rm exists, these consumers
divide their purchases evenly between the low-priced …rms. The complementary
fraction U = 1 ¡ I of consumers are uninformed about prices and hence pick
…rms from which to purchase at random. Given these assumptions, we de…ne a
simultaneous-move game played by N …rms as follows. A pure strategy for any
…rm i is a price pi 2 [c; v]. Letting p¡i denote the (N ¡ 1)-tuple of prices selected
13Related models were also explored by Shilony (1977) and Rosenthal (1980).
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by …rms other than …rm i, the pro…t to …rm i is de…ned as:
¦i(pi; p¡i) =
8<: [pi ¡ c]U=N if pi > minj 6=i pj[pi ¡ c](U=N + I=k) if pi · min
j 6=i
pj & k fj : pj = pig k= k ¡ 1
(5.1)
A mixed strategy for a …rm is a distribution function de…ned over [c; v]. If …rm i
employs the mixed strategy Fi and the strategies of its rivals are represented with







For this game, a price vector fp1,...,pNg forms a Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies if, for every …rm i and every p
0
i 2 [c; v], we have ¦i(pi; p¡i) ¸ ¦i(p0i; p¡i).
Allowing also for mixed strategies, the distributions (F1,...,FN) form a Nash equi-
librium if, for every …rm i and every distribution function F
0
i , we have that
Ei(Fi; F¡i) ¸ Ei(F 0i ; F¡i). A symmetric Nash equilibrium is then a Nash equi-
librium (F1; :::FN) satisfying Fi = F , for all i = 1,..,N . Let p(F ) and p(F )
denote the two endpoints of the support of F ; i.e., p(F ) = inffp : F (p) = 1g and
p(F ) = supfp : F (p) = 0g: We may now present the main …nding:
Proposition 5.1:(A) There does not exist a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
(B) There exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium F . It satis…es:
(i) p(F ) = v;
(ii) [p(F )¡ c](U=N + I) = [v ¡ c](U=N)
(iii) [p¡ c](U=N +(1¡F (p))N¡1I) = [v¡ c](U=N) for every p 2 [p(F ); p(F )].
The proof is relegated to the appendix. The proposition re‡ects the natural
economic tension that each …rm faces between the incentive to cut price—o¤er a
“sale”— in order to increase its chances of winning the informed consumers and
the incentive to raise its price in order to better pro…t on its captive stock of
uninformed consumers. This tension precludes the existence of a pure-strategy
equilibrium, since the presence of informed consumers induces a …rm to undercut
its rivals when price exceeds marginal cost, while the presence of uninformed
consumers induces a …rm to raise its price when price equals marginal cost. In the
mixed-strategy equilibrium, these competing incentives are resolved when …rms
select prices in a random manner, with some …rms o¤ering sales and other …rms
electing to post higher prices.
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Now, while the speci…c predictions of the model seem to accord with casual
observations and also with formal empirical studies,14 the very literal and direct
use of mixed strategies to explain price ‡uctuations raises some questions of in-
terpretation. Do …rms really select prices in a random manner? Correspondingly,
are …rms really indi¤erent over all prices in a certain range? And, if so, what
compels a …rm to draw its price from the speci…c equilibrium distribution? To
address these questions, we develop next a puri…cation argument that applies to
this game.
Purification
We apply here Harsanyi’s (1973) idea to interpret the mixed-strategy equilib-
rium of this game as an approximation to a pure-strategy equilibrium of a nearby
game with some uncertainty over rival’s costs. The uncertainty ensures that a …rm
is never quite sure as to the actual prices that rivals will select, and so incom-
plete information plays a role analogous to randomization in the mixed-strategy
equilibrium presented above.
Consider now an incomplete-information version of the above game in which
the …rms’ cost functions are private information. Firm i is of type ti 2 [0; 1]:
A …rm knows its own type but it does not know the types of the other …rms.
It believes that the types of the others are realizations of i.i.d random variables
with uniform distribution over [0; 1]. The …rm’s type determines its cost function:
…rm i of type ti has cost c(ti), where the function c is di¤erentiable and strictly
increasing and 0 < c (0) < c(1) < v: As before, the …rms simultaneously choose
prices and receive the corresponding market shares and pro…ts. Thus, this model
is a standard Bayesian game with type spaces [0; 1] and uniformly distributed
beliefs. Notice that the uniform distribution of the beliefs is without loss of
generality, since any di¤erentiable distribution of costs can still be obtained by
the appropriate choice of the cost function c: In this game, a pure strategy for any
…rm i is a function, Pi(ti), that maps [0; 1] into [c(0); v]. Given a strategy pro…le
[P1; :::; PN ], let P¡i denote the strategies of the …rms other than i and let P¡i(t¡i)
denote the vector of prices prescribed by these strategies when these …rms’ types
are given by the (N ¡ 1)-tuple t¡i: The pro…t of …rm i of type ti that charges pi
when its rivals are of types t¡i is ¦i(pi; P¡i(t¡i); ti) where ¦i is given by (5.1) in
which c is replaced with c(ti). The pro…le [P1; :::; PN ] is a Nash equilibrium if, for
14For example, Villas-Boas (1995) uses price data on co¤ee and saltine cracker products, and
argues that the pricing patterns oberved for these products are consistent with the Varian model.
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A symmetric Nash equilibrium is such that Pi(ti) = P (ti) for all i and ti.
The distribution of prices induced by a strictly increasing strategy P is given
by G(x) = Probft j P (t) · xg = P¡1(x):
Proposition 5.2: (i) In the incomplete-information game, there exists a pure-
strategy and strict Nash equilibrium, P .
(ii) Given a constant c 2 (0; v); for any " > 0; there exists ± > 0 such that, if
j c(t)¡ c j< ± for all t, then the distribution of prices induced by P , P¡1(x); is "
close to Fc; the mixed-strategy equilibrium of the complete-information game with
common per-unit cost c.
The proof is relegated to the appendix. In other words, the pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium that arises in the incomplete-information game when the costs
are near c for all t generates approximately the same distribution over prices as
occurs in the mixed-strategy equilibrium of the complete-information game with
common cost c. The mixed-strategy equilibrium for Varian’s game can thus be
interpreted as describing a pure-strategy equilibrium for a market environment in
which …rms acquire cost characteristics that may di¤er slightly and are privately
known.
Discussion
The important substantive message of this theory is that price ‡uctuations
which take the form of sales and promotions are largely explained as a consequence
of straightforward price competition in the presence of buyers with varying degrees
of information, rather than by some signi…cant exogenous randomness in the basic
data. When we adopt the interpretation of the puri…ed version, the intuition can
be described as follows. When there is a mix of better informed and less informed
consumers, there are con‡icting incentives to price high and low as explained
above. Price competition arbitrates the low and high prices to the point where
they are nearly equally pro…table. In such a situation, relatively small di¤erences
in the …rms’ pro…t functions, such as those caused by small cost shocks, can
yield large price movements. What this insight means for the empiricist is that
the relevant data for understanding such markets concerns perhaps the nature of
consumer information to a larger extent than it concerns technological or taste
factors.
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The predictions of this model appear even more compelling, when one looks
at the immediate dynamic extension. Like in any other static oligopoly game,
the featured one-shot equilibrium corresponds to the non-collusive SPE of the
repeated version of this game. We mention this obvious point speci…cally, since
when the mixed strategy is played repeatedly, di¤erent …rms can be expected to
o¤er sales in di¤erent periods, which is a prediction that seems consistent with
casual observation. In the dynamic puri…ed version, each …rm is privately informed
of its current cost at the start of each period, and the cost shocks are assumed
independent across time. The periodic cost shock might re‡ect, for example, …rm-
speci…c data like the level of the …rm’s inventories and the extent to which it is
pressed for storage space.
Notice that the use of the game theoretic model here goes beyond a formal
exposition of some natural intuition. In the absence of systematic equilibrium
analysis and the concept of equilibrium in mixed strategies, it would be di¢cult
or even impossible to come up with this explanation. Only once the result is
obtained, it becomes possible to understand it intuitively.
6. On the contribution of industrial organization theory to
game theory
Although industrial organization theory has been mainly a user of concepts and
ideas which had been generated by game theory without an explicit industrial
organization motivation, the relationship has not been totally one-sided. There
are speci…c ideas that grew out of problems in industrial organization that gained
independent importance as game theoretic topics in their own right. In what
follows, we describe in detail one idea of this nature.
Repeated games with imperfect monitoring – ‘‘price wars’’
The development of this model was motivated by the observation that some
oligopolistic industries experience spells of relatively high prices, which seem to
result from implicit collusion, interrupted by spells of more aggressive price com-
petition, referred to as “price wars.”15 A somewhat trivial theory could point out
that this is consistent with the paths of certain SPE in a repeated oligopoly game.
In such an equilibrium the …rms coordinate for a while on collusive behavior (high
prices or small quantities), then switch for a while to the one-shot equilibrium,
15Porter (1983) studies this pattern of behavior among …rms in the U.S. railroad industry.
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and so on. What makes this theory rather unconvincing is that the alternation
between collusion and price warfare is an arti…cial construct which does not re-
‡ect some more intuitive considerations. Moreover, there are simpler equilibria
which Pareto dominate an equilibrium of this form. A more interesting theory for
the instability of oligopolistic collusion was suggested by Rotemberg and Saloner
(1986), as reviewed above, but this explanation is con…ned to price wars triggered
by foreseen variations in demand.
The theory suggested by Green and Porter (1984) views the oligopolistic in-
teraction as a repeated game with imperfect public information. In the repeated
Cournot version of this approach (which is the version analyzed by Green and
Porter), the …rms simultaneously choose outputs in each period, and the price
is a function of the aggregate output and some random demand shock which is
unobservable to the …rms. The …rms observe the price but cannot observe their
rivals’ outputs; consequently, a …rm cannot tell whether a low price is the result
of a bad demand shock or a high output by some rival. While the …rms would
like to collude on producing smaller outputs than those entailed by the static
Cournot equilibrium, in this imperfect-monitoring environment it is impossible to
sustain uninterrupted collusion. Intuitively, low prices cannot always go unpun-
ished, since then …rms would be induced to deviate from the collusive behavior.
But this implies that collusion must sometimes break down into a “price war”
along the equilibrium path. Reasoning in this way, Green and Porter constructed
equilibria which exhibit on their paths spells of collusive behavior interrupted by
blocks of time (following bad demand shocks) during which the …rms revert to
playing the Cournot equilibrium of the one-shot game.
It is somewhat easier to illustrate this point using a simple version of a repeated
Bertrand duopoly game.16 Two …rms produce a homogenous product at zero
cost. The demand depends on the state of nature: with probability ® there is no
demand, and with probability (1¡ ®) the demand is a simple step function
Q(p) =
(
2 if p · 1
0 otherwise
The …rms simultaneously choose prices pi 2 [0; 1]. If the prices are equal,
the …rms share the demand equally; otherwise, the low-price …rm gets the entire
16The discussion here is in‡uenced by Tirole’s (1988) presentation.
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demand. The payo¤s of the …rms in the high-demand state are
¼i(pi; pj) =
8><>:
2pi if pi < pj
pi if pi = pj
0 if pi > pj
and in the zero-demand case the payo¤s to …rms are zero. The …rms do not
observe the realization of the demand directly, but only their own shares. So, if
both charged price p and the demand was high, these facts are public information.
Otherwise, the only public information is that no such event occurred.
In the repeated game version, this interaction is repeated in each period t =
1; 2,... The …rms’ payo¤s are the discounted sums of their pro…ts with a common
discount factor ±. In addition, assume that at the end of each period t the …rms
commonly observe a realization of a random variable, xt, distributed uniformly
over [0; 1] and independently across periods. This variable is a mere “sunspot”
which does not a¤ect the demand or any other of the “real” magnitudes, but the
possibility to condition on it enriches the set of strategies in a way that simpli…es
the analysis. A public history of the game at t is a sequence ht = (a1; :::; at¡1),
where either (i) ar = (p; x) which means that, in period r, demand was high, both
prices were equal to p > 0 and the realization x was observed, or (ii) ar = (»; x)
which means that either both prices were 0 or at least one of the …rms sold nothing
at r. A strategy for …rm i prescribes a price choice for each period t after any
possible public history. A sequential equilibrium (SE) is a pair of strategies (which
depend on public histories) such that i’s strategy is best response to j’s strategy,
i 6= j = 1; 2, after any public history.
In the one-shot game, the only equilibrium is the Bertrand Equilibrium: pi = 0,
i = 1; 2. Inde…nite repetition of this equilibrium is of course a SE in the repeated
game. If the demand state became observable at the end of each period, then
provided that ± is su¢ciently large, the repeated game would have a perfectly
collusive SPE in which p1 = p2 = 1 in perpetuity. It is immediate to see that, in
the present model, there is no perfectly collusive SE. If there were such a SE, in
which the …rms always choose pi = 1 along the path, it would have to be that …rm
i continues to choose pi = 1 after periods in which it does not get any demand.
But, then it would be pro…table for …rm j to undercut i’s price.
The interesting observation from the viewpoint of oligopoly theory is that
there are equilibria which exhibit some degree of collusion and that, due to the
impossibility of perfect collusion, such equilibria must involve some sort of “price
warfare” on their path. Green and Porter identi…ed a class of such equilibria that
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alternate along their path between a collusive phase and a punishment phase. In
the present version of the model, these equilibria are described in the following
manner. In the collusive phase the …rms charge pi = 1, and in the punishment
phase they charge pi = 0. The transition between the phases is then characterized
by a nonnegative integer T and a number ¯ 2 [0; 1]. The punishment phase is
triggered at some period t by a “bad” public observation of the form at¡1 = (»; x),
where x < ¯; the collusive phase is restarted after T periods of punishment.
To construct such a SE, let T and ¯ be as above. De…ne the set of (“good”)
histories G(T) to consist of: (i) the empty history; (ii) histories that end with (1; x)
for any x; (iii) histories such that since the beginning or since the last observation
of the form (1; x) there has been a block of exactly k(T + 1) observations of the
form (»; x), where k is a natural number. De…ne the strategy fT;¯ as follows
fT;¯(h) =
8><>:
1 if h 2 G(T )
1 if h = (h0; (»; x)) where h0 2 G(T ) & x ¸ ¯
0 otherwise
Thus, the occurrence of the bad demand state does not always trigger the punish-
ment, but only when x < ¯. Suppose that both …rms play this strategy and let
VT;¯ denote the expected discounted payo¤ for a …rm calculated at the beginning
of a period, after a history that belongs to G(T ):
VT;¯ = 1¡ ®+ (1¡ ®¯)±VT;¯ + ®¯±T+1VT;¯ (6.1)
The RHS captures the fact that, when both follow this strategy, with probability
®¯, there is no demand and x < ¯, so the interaction will switch to the punishment
phase for T periods; and with probability 1¡ ®¯ = ®(1¡ ¯) + (1 ¡ ®), there is
either no demand and x ¸ ¯ or there is high demand, in which cases …rms will
continue colluding in the following period. Each …rm gets a unit pro…t in the
current period with probability 1¡ ®. Rearrangement of the above gives
VT;¯ = (1¡ ®)=[1¡ ± + ®¯(± ¡ ±T+1)] (6.2)
To verify that these strategies constitute an equilibrium, it is enough to check that
there is no pro…table single-period deviation after histories such that fT;¯(h) = 1
(since p1 = p2 = 0 is a Nash Equilibrium of the one-shot game there is clearly no
incentive to deviate after other histories). Thus, the equilibrium condition is
2(1¡ ®) + (1¡ ¯)±VT;¯ + ¯±T+1VT;¯ · VT;¯ (6.3)
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The LHS captures the value of a single-period deviation. The payo¤ 2 is the
supremum over the immediate payo¤s that a …rm can get by undercutting its
rival’s price. Since the deviation yields public information of the form (»; x), the
continuation will be determined by the size of x: with probability (1¡ ¯), x ¸ ¯
so the collusion will continue in the next period yielding the value ±VT;¯; and with
probability ¯, x < ¯ so the T -periods punishment phase begins yielding the value
±T+1VT;¯, associated with the renewed collusion after T periods. Rearrange (6.3)
to get
VT;¯ ¸ 2(1¡ ®)=[1¡ ± + ¯(± ¡ ±T+1)] (6.4)
Proposition 6.1: (i) There exists an equilibrium of this form (with possibly
in…nite T ), i¤
® · 1¡ 1
2±
(6.5)
(ii) For any ® and ± satisfying (6.5), let T (®; ±) = minfT j (1¡ ±)=(1¡ 2®)±(1¡
±T ) · 1g:
argmax
T;¯
[VT;¯ s:t: (6:3)] = f(T; ¯) j T ¸ T (®; ±) and ¯ = 1¡ ±
(1¡ 2®)±(1¡ ±T )g
Proof. (i) Substitute from (6.2) to the LHS of (6.4) to get that a (T; ¯) equilib-
rium exists i¤





2¯(± ¡ ±T+1) (6.7)
Since the RHS increases with T and ¯, if this inequality holds for some T and ¯,
it must hold for T =1 and ¯ = 1. Thus, there are some T and ¯ for which (6.7)
holds i¤ (6.5) holds.
(ii) Let (T; ¯) be an equilibrium con…guration that maximizes VT;¯: For T 0 ¸ T ,
de…ne ¯ 0 = ¯(1 ¡ ±T )=(1 ¡ ±T 0) and observe that (T 0; ¯ 0) is also an equilibrium
con…guration that maximizes VT;¯: To see this, note …rst that ¯
0 · ¯ · 1: Second,
since (6.6) holds for (T; ¯), it holds for (T 0; ¯0) as the denominator remains the
same and this implies that it is an equilibrium. Third, VT 0;¯0 = VT;¯, since (6.2)
gets the same value with (T; ¯) and (T 0; ¯0): Thus, in particular, an equilibrium
with T =1 is always among the maximizers of VT;¯:
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Next, observe from (6.2) that V1;¯ is decreasing in ¯ , so that V1;¯ is max-
imized at the minimal ¯ that satis…es (6.7) with T = 1; which is ¯1 = (1 ¡
±)=(1 ¡ 2®)±. Now, inspection of (6.2) implies that, for an equilibrium with
T < 1 to be also a maximizer of VT;¯; it has to be that the ¯ of this equi-
librium satis…es ¯ = ¯1=(1 ¡ ±T ). This is possible only for T ’s such that
¯1=(1¡ ±T ) ´ (1¡ ±)=(1¡ 2®)±(1¡ ±T ) · 1; i.e., only for T ¸ T (®; ±).
This proposition shows that, for some range of the parameters, there are equi-
libria which exhibit the sought after form of behavior: spells of collusion inter-
rupted by price wars. Part (ii) shows that there are such equilibria among the
optimal ones in the T; ¯–class. Moreover, a result due to Abreu, Pearce and Stac-
chetti (1986) implies that, in this model, the optimal equilibria in the T; ¯–class
are also optimal among all symmetric equilibria (not just optimal in the T; ¯–
class). So the sought after alternation between collusion and price wars on the
equilibrium path emerges, even when we insist on optimal symmetric equilibria.
This observation is somewhat quali…ed by the fact that the T = 1 equilib-
rium, which does not alternate between the two regimes, is always among the
optimal equilibria as well. The present model however is rather special. In par-
ticular, it has the property that the worst punishments that the parties can in‡ict
on one another coincide with the Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game. Abreu,
Pearce and Stacchetti (1986) show in a more general model that there is a joint
pro…t maximizing symmetric equilibrium that starts with playing the most collu-
sive outcome and then switches into the worst sequential equilibrium. However, in
models such as the repeated Cournot game, in which the one-shot equilibrium does
not coincide with the worst punishment, the worst sequential equilibrium itself
would involve alternation between the collusive outcome and another “punishing”
outcome. So the behavior along the path of the optimal symmetric equilibrium
would still have the appearance of collusion interrupted by price wars. The narra-
tive that accompanies this equilibrium is less direct: the spells of collusion are in
some sense rewards for sticking to the punishment and they are hence triggered by
su¢ciently bad public signals (low prices in the Cournot version) which con…rm
the …rms’ adherence to the punishment. In this sense, the behavior captured by
these equilibria is not as “natural” or “straightforward” as the behavior captured
by the original Green-Porter equilibrium.
The relevance of imperfect monitoring for cartel instability gets an additional
twist once asymmetric equilibria are considered. Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin
(1993) show that, when the public signal satis…es a certain full dimensionality
property and ± is su¢ciently close to 1, there are (asymmetric) equilibrium out-
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comes which are arbitrarily close to the Pareto e¢cient outcome. Thus, under
such conditions, the extent of “price warfare” is insigni…cant along the path of
the optimal equilibrium.
The imperfect-monitoring model of collusion contributes importantly to the
understanding of cartel instability. In addition, while it obviously started from a
clear industrial organization motivation, this model has also generated a research
line in the theory of repeated games with unobservable moves that has assumed
a life of its own and that continues to grow in directions that are now largely
removed from the original motivation.17
7. An overview and assessment
Non-cooperative game theory has become the standard language and the main
methodological framework of industrial organization. Before the onset of game
theory, industrial organization was not without analytical methodology — the
highly developed methodology of price theory served industrial organization as
well. But traditional price theory addresses e¤ectively only situations of perfect
competition or pure monopoly, while industrial organization theory emphasizes
the spectrum that lies between these two extremes: the study of issues like col-
lusion and predation simply requires an oligopoly model. This gap was …lled by
verbal theorizing and an array of semi-formal and formal models. The formal
models included game models like those of Cournot, Bertrand and Stackelberg, as
well as non-game models with strategic ‡avor such as the conjectural variations
and the contestable market models. Before proceeding with the discussion, we
pause here to describe the conjectural variations model,18 which is an important
representative of the formal pre-game theoretic framework.
A pre-game theoretic model: the conjectural variations model
This model attempts to capture within an atemporal framework both the
actual actions of the oligopolists and their responses to each other’s choices. In
17Repeated game models with imperfect monitoring had been considered somewhat earlier
by Rubinstein (1979) and Radner (1981), who analyzed repeated Principal-Agent relationships.
Besides the di¤erent basic game, these contributions also di¤er in their solution concepts (Stack-
elberg and Epsilon-Nash respectively) and their method of evaluating payo¤ streams (limit-of-
the-means criterion). It seems however that, due to these di¤erences or other reasons, the
Green-Porter article has been more in‡uential in terms of stimulating the literature.
18For a traditional description of this model, see Fellner (1949); for a modern view from the
game theoretic perspective, see Friedman (1990).
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the quantity-competition duopoly version, two …rms, 1 and 2, produce outputs,
q1 and q2, which determine the price, P (q1+q2), and hence the pro…ts, ¼i(qi; qj) =
qiP (q1 + q2)¡ ci(qi). Firm i holds a conjecture, qCi , regarding j’s output. In the
conjectural variations framework, this conjecture may in fact depend on …rm i’s
own choice, qi; i.e., qCi = vi(qi). An equilibrium is then a pair of outputs, q
¤
i ,
i = 1; 2, such that
q¤i = argmaxqi
¼i[qi; vi(qi)] and vi(q
¤
i ) = q
¤
j i = 1; 2:
Thus, each …rm maximizes its pro…t under the conjecture that its rival’s out-
put will vary with its own choice, and the conjecture is not contradicted at the
equilibrium.
In many applications, the vi’s were assumed linear in the qi’s (at least in the
neighborhood of the solution) with slope v. Under this assumption, the parameter
v indexes the equilibrium level of collusion: with v = 1; 0 and ¡1, the equilibrium
outcome coincides with the joint monopoly outcome, the Cournot equilibrium
outcome and the perfectly competitive outcome, respectively, and with other v’s
in this range the outcome falls between those mentioned.
Notice that, unlike non-cooperative game theoretic models, this model remains
vague about the order of moves. In fact, if we tried to …t this model with an exten-
sive form, it would have to be such that each …rm believes that it is moving ahead
of the other …rm. This is possible only if the …rms hold inconsistent beliefs (say,
di¤erent prior beliefs over the moves of nature who chooses the actual sequence
of moves). But obviously this model was not meant to capture behavior under a
special form of inconsistent beliefs. It is probably more appropriate to think of it
as a reduced form of an underlying dynamic interaction that is left unmodelled.
It is important to note that, in the pre–game theoretic literature, the con-
jectural variations model was not viewed as di¤erent in principle from the game
theoretic models. This is because the game models were viewed then somewhat
di¤erently than they are viewed now. They were not seen as speci…c applications
of a very deep and encompassing theory, the Nash equilibrium theory, but rather
as isolated speci…c models using a somewhat ad-hoc solution concept. In fact,
the Nash equilibria of these models were often viewed as a special case of the
conjectural variations model and were often referred to as the “zero-conjectural-
variations” case.
Having mentioned the theoretical background against which the game theo-
retic models were introduced, let us try to assess brie‡y the contribution of this
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change in the theoretical framework of industrial organization. The following
points discuss some aspects of this contribution both to the expositional role of
the theory and to its substance.
Game theory as a language. The …rst contribution of game theory to
industrial organization is the introduction of a language: models are described
in an accurate and economical way using standard familiar formats, and basic
non-cooperative solution concepts are commonly employed. One clear bene…t
of this standardization is improved accessibility: a formal political theorist or
a mathematician can access relatively easily the writings in modern industrial
organization theory, without a long introduction to the speci…c culture of the
…eld. This requires, of course, some basic familiarity with the language of game
theory. But the pre-game theoretic literature also had by and large a language of
its own – it was just not as universal and as e¢cient as game theory.
To appreciate the contribution of game theory simply as a language, one merely
has to read through some of the presentations of formal models in the pre-game
theoretic literature. The above description of the conjectural variations model
already bene…ted from the game theoretic language and perhaps does not re‡ect
appropriately the ambiguity that often surrounded the presentation of this model.
The ambiguity that naturally results from the timeless unmodelled dynamics was
further exacerbated in many cases by presentations that described the central
assumptions of the model only in terms of derivatives (perhaps to avoid the em-
barrassment of describing the inconsistent beliefs explicitly).
Game theory has the additional virtue of being a more ‡exible language, in
the sense that it allows consideration of situations involving dynamic interaction
and imperfect information regarding behavior and the environment. The ‡exibil-
ity of the game theoretic framework in these respects derives perhaps from the
rather primitive structure of non-cooperative game models, which set forth all
actions and their timing. To be sure, the consideration of dynamic interaction
and imperfect information complicates the models and raises additional concep-
tual problems (say, about the appropriate solution concept). Nevertheless, game
theory does provide a systematic and formal language with which to explore these
considerations - something that was not available in the pre-game theoretic lit-
erature. For example, in the conjectural variations model of collusion, it is not
even clear how to begin thinking about the consequences of secret price cutting
for collusive conduct. This model is not suitable for such an analysis, since it fails
to describe the information that …rms possess and the timing of their actions.
Furthermore, there is no obvious way to add these dimensions. By contrast, such
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an analysis is natural in the context of the repeated game model of collusion, as
discussed in the Green-Porter model reviewed in Section 6. This ‡exibility is an
important asset of the game theoretic framework.
Game theory as a discipline. Related to its role as a language, game
theory also imposes a discipline on modeling. First, a non-cooperative game model
requires the analyst to specify precisely the actions available to players, the timing
of the actions and the information held by players. This forces modelers to face
their assumptions and hence to question them. For example, the repeated game
collusion models of Sections 4 and 6 are very speci…c about the behavior and the
information of …rms. By contrast, in the conjectural variations model, no explicit
assumptions on behavior are presented, so that one can judge the model only by
the postulated outcome.
Second, with the game theoretic framework, results have to satisfy the require-
ments of known solution concepts, usually Nash equilibrium and its re…nements.
This forces arguments to be complete in the way dictated by these solutions. The
brief review of the development of the literature on entry deterrence at the end of
Section 2 illustrates this point. The argument on the role of investment and price
in deterrence became complete, only after the situation was described as a simple
two-stage game and analyzed with the appropriate solution concept of SPE.
The imposition of the game theoretic discipline has some drawbacks as well.
First, it naturally constrains the range of ideas that can be expressed and inhibits
researchers from venturing beyond its boundaries. Second, careless use of game
theory may lead to substantial misconceptions. The Nash equilibrium concept
is not always compelling. Standard game theoretic models often presume high
degrees of rationality and knowledge on the part of the players, and the full force
of such assumptions is often not acknowledged in applications. Third, there is a
sense in which non-cooperative game models require the modeler to specify too
much. The game theoretic collusion models specify whether the …rms move simul-
taneously or alternately, what exactly they observe, and so on. These features are
normally not known to observers and natural intuition suggests that they should
not be too relevant. However, they have to be speci…ed and even worse they
often matter a great deal for the analysis. If one were very con…dent about the
accuracy of the description and the validity of the solution concept, the important
role of the …ne details of the model might provide important insights. But since
the models are often viewed as a rather rough sketch of what goes on, the sensi-
tivity of predicted outcomes to modeling details is bothersome. In contrast, the
conjectural variations model summarizes complicated interaction simply, without
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spending much e¤ort on the speci…cation of arti…cial features, so that the …ne
details do not interfere with the overall picture.
The substantive impact of game theory. So industrial organization has a
new language/discipline and perhaps a superior one to what it had before, but has
this language generated new insights to the substance of industrial organization?
By taking a very broad view, one might argue that it has not. Take oligopoly the-
ory, for example. In the pre-game theoretic era, economists clearly recognized the
potential ine¢ciency of oligopolistic competition, the forces that work to induce
and di¤use collusion and the possibility that di¤erent degrees of collusion could
be sustained by threats of retaliation. In some sense, this is what is known now,
too.
But a closer look reveals quite a few new speci…c insights. In fact, each of
the previous sections described what we believe to be a new insight, and we
attempted to identify the crucial role of the game theoretic framework in reaching
these insights. For example, the idea that export subsidies can play a strategic role
that might rationalize their use would be di¢cult to conceive without the game
theoretic framework. In fact, it runs contrary to intuition based on standard price
theory. Similarly, in the absence of this framework, it would be hard to conceive
of the idea that random pricing in the form of sales is a robust phenomenon which
derives from the heterogeneous price information (or search costs) that di¤erent
segments of the consumer population enjoy.
But the fact that a certain relationship that exists within the model can be
interpreted in terms of the underlying context, and is thus regarded as an insight,
does not necessarily mean that it truly o¤ers a better qualitative understanding
of important aspects of actual market behavior. There remains the question of
whether or not such an insight is more than a mere artifact of the model. For ex-
ample, as discussed in section 2, the strategic explanation of export subsidization
(taxation) might be questioned in light of the sensitivity of this explanation to
modeling decisions (Cournot vs. Bertrand). All things considered, however, we
believe that the insights described above identify qualitative forces that plausibly
play important roles in actual markets.
At the same time, we also stress that these insights should not be taken too
literally. For example, the model of Section 5 tells us that sales can be a stable
phenomenon through which price competition manifests itself. The insight is that
this phenomenon need not re‡ect some important instability in the technology or
pattern of demand; rather, sales emerge naturally from price competition when
consumers are heterogeneously informed. Of course, this is not to say that …rms
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know exactly some distribution and go through the precise equilibrium reasoning.
The point is only that they have some rough idea that others are also pursuing
these sales policies, and given this they have no clearly superior alternative than
to also have sales in response to small private signals.
Let us accept then that many insights derived from the game theoretic ap-
proach o¤er a better qualitative understanding of important aspects of actual
market behavior. We may still question the deeper signi…cance of these insights.
In particular, has the game theoretic framework delivered a new class of models
that consistently facilitates better quantitative predictions than what would have
been available in its absence? A serious attempt to discuss this question would
take us well beyond the scope of this paper. Here, we note that important new
empirical work in industrial organization makes extensive use of game theoretic
models, but we also caution that there is as yet no simple basis from which to con-
clude that the game theoretic approach provides consistently superior quantitative
predictions.
This inconclusive answer regarding the quantitative contribution of game the-
ory does not imply that the usefulness of this framework for policy decisions is
doubtful. Even if game theory has not produced a magic formula that would
enable a regulator to make a de…nitive quantitative assessment as to the con-
sequences of a proposed merger, this framework has enabled the regulators to
think more thoroughly about the possible consequences of the merger. Likewise,
it o¤ers the regulator a deeper perspective on the issue of predation. To be sure,
it does not o¤er a magic formula here either. But it makes it possible to have
a more complete list of scenarios in which predation might be practiced and to
use such arguments to justify intervention in situations that would not warrant
intervention on the basis of simple price theoretic arguments.
8. Appendix
Proposition 3.1: (i) There exists a separating intuitive equilibrium.
(ii). If pmL ¸ p, then any separating intuitive equilibrium, fP;E; bg, satis…es
p = P (L) < P (H) = pmH and E(P (L)) = 0 < 1 = E(P (H)).
If pmL < p, then any separating intuitive equilibrium, fP;E; bg, satis…es pmL =
P (L) < P (H) = pmH and E(P (L)) = 0 < 1 = E(P (H)).
(iii) If pmL ¸ p, and b0L ¸ ebL, then for every p 2 [p; pmL ], there exists an intuitive
pooling equilibrium in which P (L) = P (H) = p.
(iv) In any intuitive pooling equilibrium, P (L) = P (H) 2 [p; pmL ] and E(P (L)) =
41
0.
Proof. (i) For the case pmL < p;de…ne the triplet fP;E; bg as follows: P is as in
(ii) above, E(p) = 1 i¤ p 6= pmL , bL(p) = 0 if p 6= pmL and bL(pmL ) = 1: It is direct
to verify that this triplet satis…es (E1)-E(4).
For the case pmL ¸ p, de…ne the triplet fP;E; bg as follows: P is as in (ii) above,
E(p) = 1 i¤ p 2 (p; p], bL(p) = 0 if p 2 (p; p] and bL(p) = 1 otherwise. This triplet
clearly satis…es (E1) when t = H and when t = L and pmL = p. It also satis…es
(E2)-(E4). The remaining step is to show that (E1) holds when t = L and pmL > p.
For any p such that E(p) = 0, arguments using (SCP) developed in the proof of
(ii) below establish that a deviation is non-improving: V (p; 0; L) > V (p; 0; L).
Among p such that E(p) = 1, the most attractive deviation is the monopoly
price, pmL : It is thus su¢cient to con…rm that V (p; 0; L) > V (p
m
L ; 1; L). To this
end de…ne p0 < p by V (p0; 0;H) = V (pmL ; 1;H). Using the concavity of ¦ and
thus V in p, as well as (SCP), we see that this deviation is also non-improving:
V (p; 0; L) > V (p0; 0; L) > V (pmL ; 1; L).
(ii) Let fP;E; bg be a separating intuitive equilibrium. First, (E2) and (E3)
imply that E(P (L)) = 0 < 1 = E(P (H)). Second, P (H) must be equal to pmH ,
since P (H) 6= pmH implies
V (P (H); 1;H) < V (pmH ; 1; H) · V (pmH ; E(pmH);H)
in contradiction to (E1). Third, since the H incumbent can deter entry by choos-
ing P (L), we must have
V (P (L); 0;H) · V (pmH ; 1;H)
which implies that P (L) =2 (p; p).
Consider the case pmL ¸ p: The concavity of ¦ and hence of V in p implies that
V (p; 0; L) > V (p; 0; L) for all p < p and V (p; 0; L) > V (p; 0; L) for all p > p: The
de…nition of p and p together with (SCP) imply V (p; 0; L) > V (p; 0; L): Therefore,
it follows that, if P (L) =2 [p; p), then there is " > 0 such that
V (p¡ "; 0; L) > V (P (L); 0; L) and V (p¡ "; 0; H) < V (pmH ; 1; H)
But then (E4) implies that bL(p¡") = 1. Hence E(p¡") = 0 and V (p¡"; 0; L) >
V (P (L); 0; L) means that (E1) fails. Therefore, it must be that P (L) 2 [p; p),
which together with the previous conclusion that P (L) =2 (p; p) gives P (L) = p.
The corresponding argument for the case pmL < p is that, if P (L) 6= pmL , then
V (pmL ; 0; L) > V (P (L); 0; L) and V (p
m
L ; 0;H) < V (p
m
H ; 1; H)
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Thus, by (E4), bL(pmL ) = 1 and the incumbent’s deviation to p
m
L would be prof-
itable, so P (L) = pmL :
(iii). Consider the case pmL ¸ p and bL ¸ ebL: Let p0 2 [p; pmL ] and de…ne
fP;E; bg as follows: P (L) = P (H) = p0; E(p) = 0 for p · p0 and E(p) = 1
for p > p0; bL(p) = b0L for p · p0 and bL(p) = 0 for p > p0. It is a routine
matter to verify that fP;E; bg satisfy (E1)-(E3). To verify that b satis…es (E4),
observe that all p < p0 are sure to reduce pro…t below the equilibrium level for
both types, and hence (E4) places no restriction. Next de…ne p00 by V (p0; 0; H) =
V (p00; 0;H). For p 2 (p0; p00], V (p; 0;H) ¸ V (p0; 0; H), and hence bL(p) = 0 satis…es
(E4). For p > p00, observe that (SCP) implies V (p00; 0; L) < V (p0; 0; L) and then
the concavity of ¦ in p implies p00 > pmL : Hence V (p; 0; L) < V (p
00; 0; L) and
consequently V (p; 0; L) < V (p0; 0; L), so that bL(p) = 0 satis…es (E4). Therefore,
fP;E; bg is a pooling intuitive equilibrium.
(iv) Let fP;E; bg be a pooling intuitive equilibrium. Let p0 denote the equi-
librium price. First, E(p0) must be 0, since otherwise, for at least one t 2 fL;Hg,
pmt 6= p0 and an incumbent of this type t could pro…tably deviate to pmt : Equilib-
rium pro…ts are thus given by v(L) ´ V (p0; 0; L) and v(H) ´ V (p0; 0;H):
Clearly, p0 ¸ p; since otherwise the H incumbent will deviate to pmH : Suppose
then that p0 > pmL : There are two cases to consider. First, if p
0 > pmH , de…ne p
00 <
pmH by V (p
00; 0; H) = v(H). Then (SCP) implies V (p00; 0; L) > v(L), and so (E2)
and (E4) imply E(p00¡ ") = 0 for small " > 0. But then V (p00¡ ";E(p00¡ "); L) >
v(L), contradicting (E1). Second, if p0 2 (pmL ; pmH ], choose a su¢ciently small " > 0
such that p0¡" > pmL . Then V (p0¡"; 0; H) < v(H) and V (p0¡"; 0; L) > v(L), and
so (E4) and (E2) imply E(p0 ¡ ") = 0. Therefore, V (p00¡ "; E(p00¡ "); L) > v(L),
contradicting (E1) for the L incumbent. The conclusion is that p0 · pmL and hence
p0 2 [p; pmL ].
Proposition 4.1: There exists a symmetric SPE which maximizes the total pay-




p(L) = p(H) = 1 for ± > H
(1+w)H+(1¡w)L
p(L) = 1; p(H) = ±(1¡w)L
H[1¡±(1+w)] for
H
(1+w)H+(1¡w)L ¸ ± ¸ 12
p(H) = p(L) = 0 for ± < 1=2
Proof. First, let us verify that the path described in the claim is consistent
with SPE. This path is the outcome of the following …rms’ strategies: charge
pi in state i = L;H, unless there has been a deviation, in which case charge 0.
Obviously, these strategies are mutual best responses in any subgame following a
deviation. In other subgames, there are only two relevant deviations to consider:
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slightly undercutting p(H) in state H and slightly undercutting p(L) in state L.
Undercutting p(H) is unpro…table if and only if
fp(H)H + ±[wp(H)H + (1¡ w)p(L)L]=(1¡ ±)g=2 ¸ p(H)H
where the LHS captures the payo¤ of continuing along the path and the RHS
captures the payo¤ associated with undercutting (a slight undercutting gives the
deviant almost twice the equilibrium pro…t once and zero thereafter). Similarly,
undercutting p(L) is unpro…table if and only if,
fp(L)L+ ±[wp(H)H + (1¡ w)p(L)L]=(1¡ ±)g=2 ¸ p(L)L
Now, it can be veri…ed that the pi’s of the proposition satisfy these two conditions
in the appropriate ranges.
The following three steps show that this equilibrium maximizes the sum of the
…rms’ payo¤s, over the set of all SPE. First, for any SPE, there is a symmetric
SPE in which the sum of the payo¤s is the same. To see this, take a SPE in which
pti 6= ptj somewhere on the path and modify it so that everywhere on the path
the two prices are equal to minfpti; ptjg and so that any deviation is punished by
reversion to the zero prices forever. At t such that in the original SPE pti < p
t
j,
…rm j still does not want to undercut, since its continuation value is at least
half while its immediate gain is exactly half of the corresponding gains in the
original SPE. By symmetry, this applies to i as well. At t such that in the
original SPE pti = p
t
j, for at least one of the …rms, the continuation value is not
smaller while the gain from undercutting is the same as in the original SPE,
and by symmetry the other …rm does not pro…t from the undercutting either.
Second, let V denote the maximal sum of payo¤s over the set of all SPE (since
the set of SPE payo¤s is compact, such maximum exists). Consider a symmetric
equilibrium with sum of payo¤s V (which exists by the …rst step). Observe that
V must be the sum of payo¤s in any subgame on the path that starts at the
beginning of any period t before at was realized, i.e., after a history of the form
(a1; p1i ; p
1
j),...; (a
t¡1; pt¡1i ; p
t¡1
j ). If it were lower for some t, then the strategies in
that subgame could be changed to yield V . This would not destroy the equilibrium
elsewhere, since it would only make deviations less pro…table. But it will raise
the sum of payo¤s in the entire game, in contradiction to the maximality of V .
Now, after any history along the path of this equilibrium that ends with at the
equilibrium strategies must prescribe the price
'(at) = argmax
p
fpat s:t: (pat + ±V )=2 ¸ pat and p · 1g (8.1)
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Otherwise, the equilibrium that prescribes these prices at t and continues accord-
ing to the considered equilibrium elsewhere would have a higher sum of payo¤s.
Therefore, V = [w'(H)H + (1 ¡ w)'(L)L]=(1 ¡ ±). Upon substituting this for
V in (8.1), a direct solution of this problem yields '(x) = p(x), x = L;H, where
p(x) are given in the proposition.
Proposition 5.1:(A) There does not exist a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
(B) There exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium F. It satis…es:
(i) p(F ) = v;
(ii) [p(F )¡ c](U=N + I) = [v ¡ c](U=N)
(iii) [p¡ c](U=N +(1¡F (p))N¡1I) = [v¡ c](U=N) for every p 2 [p(F ); p(F )].
Proof. (A) Let k denote the number of …rms selecting the lowest price, p, and
begin with the possibility that 2 · k · N . If p > c, then a low-priced …rm
would deviate from the putative equilibrium with a price just below p, since
[p¡ c](U=N + I) > [p¡ c](U=N + I=k). On the other hand, if p = c, then a low-
priced …rm could deviate to p0 > p and earn greater pro…t, since (p0¡c)(U=N) > 0.
Consider next the possibility that k = 1. Then the low-priced …rm could deviate
to p + ", where " is chosen so that all other …rms’ prices exceed p + ", and earn
greater pro…t, since [p+ "¡ c](U=N + I) > [p¡ c](U=N + I).
(B) We begin by showing that any symmetric Nash equilibrium F satis…es (i)-
(iii). First, we note that, by the argument of the previous paragraph, p(F ) > c:
We next argue that F cannot have a mass point. If p were a mass point of F ,
then a …rm could choose a deviant strategy that is identical to the hypothesized
equilibrium strategy, except that it replaces the selection of p with the selection
of p ¡ ", for " small. The …rm then converts all events in which it ties for the
lowest price at p with events in which it uniquely o¤ers the lowest price at p¡ ".
Since ties at p occur with positive probability, and since p ¸ p(F ) > c, the …rm’s
expected pro…t would then increase if " is small enough.
Suppose now that p(F ) < v. Given that no price is selected with positive
probability, ties occur with zero probability. Thus, when a …rm chooses p(F ),
with probability one, it sells only to uninformed consumers. For " small, the
…rm would increase expected pro…ts by replacing the selection of prices in the set
[p(F )¡", p(F )] with the selection of the price v. Thus, p(F ) = v. Similarly, when
a …rm selects the price p(F ), with probability one it uniquely o¤ers the lowest price
in the market and thus sells to all informed consumers. Since expected pro…t must
be constant throughout the support of F , it follows that [p(F )¡ c](U=N + I) =
[v ¡ c](U=N).
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We argue next that F is strictly increasing over (p(F ), p(F )). Suppose instead
that there exists an interval (p1, p2) such that p(F ) < p1, p(F ) > p2 and F (p1) =
F (p2). In this case, prices in the interval (p1; p2) are selected with zero probability.
For " small, a …rm then would do better to replace the selection of prices in the
interval [p1 ¡ ", p1] with the selection of the price p2 ¡ ". Since prices in the
interval (p1, p2) are selected with zero probability, the deviation would generate
(approximately) the same distribution over market shares but at a higher price.
It follows that any interval of prices resting within the larger interval [p(F ),
p(F )] is played with positive probability. It thus must be that all prices in the
interval [p(F ), p(F )] generate the expected pro…t [v ¡ c](U=N). Now, the proba-
bility that a given price p is the lowest price is [1 ¡ F (p)]N¡1. Thus, we get the
iso-pro…t equation: [p¡c](U=N+(1¡F (p))N¡1I) = [v¡c](U=N) for all p 2 [p(F ),
p(F )].
Having proved that (i)-(iii) are necessary for a symmetric Nash equilibrium,
we now complete the proof by con…rming that there exists a unique distribution
function satisfying (i)-(iii) and that it is indeed a symmetric Nash equilibrium
strategy. Rewrite (iii) as [1 ¡ F (p)]N¡1 = (v ¡ p)U=N(p¡ c)I and observe from
(iii) that, for p 2 (p(F ), p(F )); the RHS is between 0 and 1, so that there is a
unique solution F (p) 2 (0; 1): It follows from (i)-(iii) that F (p(F )) = 0 < 1 =
F (p(F )) and F 0(p) > 0 for p 2 (p(F ); p(F )), con…rming that F is indeed a well-
de…ned distribution. To verify that F is a Nash equilibrium, consider any one
…rm and suppose that all other N ¡ 1 …rms adopt the strategy F (p) de…ned by
(i)-(iii). The given …rm then earns a constant expected pro…t for any price in
[p(F ), p(F )], and so it cannot improve upon F by altering the distribution over
this set. Furthermore, any price below p(F ) earns a lower expected pro…t than
does the price p(F ), and prices above p(F ) = v are infeasible. Given that its
rivals use the distribution function F , the …rm can do no better than to use F as
well.
Proposition 5.2: (i) In the incomplete-information game, there exists a pure-
strategy and strict Nash equilibrium, P .
(ii) Given a constant c 2 (0; v); for any " > 0, there exists ± > 0 such that, if
j c(t) ¡ c j< ± for all t, then the distribution of prices induced by P , P¡1(x);
approaches Fc; the mixed-strategy equilibrium of the complete-information game
with common per-unit cost c.
Proof. (i) Let P : [0; 1] ! [c(0); v] be de…ned by the following di¤erential
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equation and boundary condition:
P 0(t) =
[P (t)¡ c(t)][N ¡ 1][1¡ t]N¡2I
U=N + [1¡ t]N¡1I (8.2)
P (1) = v: (8.3)
Clearly, such a solution P exists and satis…es P (t) > c(t) and P 0(t) > 0 for all t.
We next show that P is a symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy. Let ª(t; et)
denote the expected pro…t of a …rm of type t that picks price P (et) when its rivals
employ the strategy P ,
ª(t; et) = [P (et)¡ c(t)]fU=N + [1¡ et]N¡1Ig
Notice that this formula utilizes the strict monotonicity of P by letting [1¡ et]N¡1
describe the probability that P (et) is the lowest price. To verify the optimality of
P (t) for a type t …rm, we only have to check that P (t) is more pro…table than
other prices in the support of P (the strict monotonicity of P implies that P (c(0))
is more pro…table than any p < P (c(0)), and P (1) = v is more pro…table than
any p > v). The function P thus constitutes a symmetric pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium if the following incentive-compatibility condition holds:
ª(t; t) ¸ ª(t; et) for all t; et 2 [0; 1] (8.4)
Observe that
ª2(t; et) = ¡[P (et)¡ c(t)][N ¡ 1][1¡ et]N¡2I + fU=N + [1¡ et]N¡1IgP 0(et) (8.5)
It therefore follows from (8.2) that
ª2(t; t) = 0 for all t 2 [0; 1]
Observe next that
ª(t; t)¡ª(t; et) = Z tet ª2(t; x)dx =
Z t













c0(y)(N ¡ 1)[1¡ x]N¡2Idy
¶
dx > 0
where the second equality follows from ª2(x; x) = 0 and the expression for
ª12(y; x) is obtained by di¤erentiating (8.5). Therefore, (8.4) is satis…ed and
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this establishes that the pure strategy P de…ned above gives a Nash equilibrium.
Notice further that a …rm of type t strictly prefers the price P (t) to any other.
(ii) To establish the approximation result, let c 2 (0; v) and let Fc denote the
symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium strategy in the complete-information game
with common per-unit costs c. De…ne the function Pc by
Pc(t) = F
¡1
c (t) for t 2 [0; 1]
This de…nition means that the distribution of prices induced by Pc is the same
as the distribution of prices generated by the equilibrium mixed-strategy Fc of
the complete-information game. Observe that Pc is the solution to (8.2)-(8.3) for
c(t) ´ c: First, note that Pc(1) = F¡1c (1) = v: Next, di¤erentiate the identity
given in part B(iii) of Proposition 5.1 to get
1 =
[p¡ c][N ¡ 1][1¡ F (p)]N¡2F 0(p)I
U=N + [1¡ F (p)]N¡1I (8.6)
Multiply both sides of (8.6) by P 0c(t) and substitute there p = Pc(t); F = Fc and
t = Fc(Pc(t)) to get
P 0c(t) =
[Pc(t)¡ c][N ¡ 1][1¡ t]N¡2I
U=N + [1¡ t]N¡1I
So the function Pc solves (8.2).
Next observe that (8.2)-(8.3) de…ne a continuous functional, Á, from the space
of non-decreasing cost functions, c : [0; 1]! (0; v); into the space of non-decreasing
price functions, P : [0; 1] ! [0; v]: Thus, for an increasing function c(¢) the
price function P (¢) = Á(c(¢)) is the symmetric equilibrium in the incomplete-
information game with costs c(¢), while for c(¢) ´ c, Á(c) = Pc . Therefore, invok-
ing the continuity of Á, we conclude that, for any " > 0; there exists ± > 0 such
that if k c(¢)¡ c k< ±; then k Á(c(¢))¡Pck < ": In other words, the pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium that arises in the incomplete-information game generates ap-
proximately the same distribution over prices as occurs in the mixed-strategy
equilibrium of the complete-information game.
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